On the
relationship between linguistic pragmatics and axiology |
|
Marta Boniśniak (Poznań) |
The aim of the present paper is to analyse a
hypothetical relationship between linguistic pragmatics and axiology and prove the
existence of common points of reference within these fields.
The first part of the paper presents major assumptions
of the disciplines in question to prepare grounds for further discussion. For
linguistic pragmatics (Levinson 1983), which studies language use in the
context of various social interactions, The Speech Act Theory (Austin 1962)
forms the focal point of research. Out of the three speech acts proposed by
Austin, we will take a closer look at an illocutionary one. At the outset, we
need to realize that communication is not merely a matter of uttering 'naked'
propositions, but expressing them with a particular illocutionary force, be it
explicit or implicit on its surface structure. Among many types and functions
of illocutionary force, we may distinguish evaluative one, crucial to our
discussion.
Axiology, a branch of philosophy, is related to the
theory of values and has as its main objective the study and classification of
values. Within the general theory of value, we may distinguish various types of
values, e.g. aesthetic, moral, cultural and the like. As such, values may be
perceived in linguistic or extralinguistic (i.e. as products and behaviours of
moral subjects) reality. In the present study, we will focus on the former. We
will relate to Dilthey's (1974) view of homo aestimans, a human being
evaluating the world. Value may here be treated as a relational property of a
cultural object that satisfies a subjective need of the subject of culture
(Wąsik 2001).
The second part of the paper offers common point of
reference for the discussion. It is here that Grice's (1957) analysis of
meaning in terms of the communicative intention of the speaker comes into play.
The author will also refer to Leech's (1983) rhetorical model of pragmatics:
that is, a model which studies linguistic communication in terms of
illocutionary goals and principles of 'good communicative behaviour'. Wieczorek
(1999) claims that any communicative event is of an ethical nature since is
takes place among moral subjects. Hence, like any other human action, it aims
at the realisation of certain values. The common point of reference here may
thus be the analysis of the speaker's intentions, beliefs, desires or needs
expressed in evaluative utterances. The paper will discuss various exemplary
utterances within the SAT framework, paying special attention to their
evaluative character.
Selected references:
Aschenbrenner, K. 1971. The Concepts of Value:
Foundations of Value Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things With Words. New York: Oxford University Press
Geis, M.L. 1998. Speech Acts and Conversational Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Givón, T. 1989. Mind, Code and Context: Essays in Pragmatics.
Hillsdale, New York: L. Erlbaum Associates.
Leech, G. 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. London:
Longman.
Levinson, S. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Lewis, Hunter. 1991. A Question of Values. Six Ways We
Make Personal Choices That Shape Our Lives. San Francisco: HarperCollins
Publishers.
Mey, J. 1993. Pragmatics. An Introduction. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Puzynina, J.
1992. Język wartości [Language of Values]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowe.
Searle, J. 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Vendler, Z. 1974. Linguistics in Philosophy. Itaca and
London: Cornell University Press.
Wąsik, Z. 2001. On the biological concept of
subjective significance: A link between the semiotics of nature and the
semiotics of culture. In: Sign Systems Studies 29.1, 83 - 106.
Wieczorek, U.
1999. Wartościowanie, perswazja, język [Valuation, Persuasion, Language].
Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.
Verschueren, J. 1999. Understanding Pragmatics. London, New York: Arnold.