Good, evil, their balance and what they tell us
about language |
|
Philippe Ségéral (University Paris 7) and Tobias
Scheer (University of Nice) |
It seems to us that
one point of convergence between Natural Phonology and the kind of Government
Phonology that we are doing is a very broad one: the existence of two basic
forces that counterbalance each other. That is, existing patterns in language
are viewed as an equilibrium state that has arisen through the interplay of
these forces, and diachronic change is the consequence of a change in
prominence among them. In Natural Phonology, this description corresponds to
the interplay of higher principles such as the law of the least effort vs. the
need to produce contrast/ to be expressive. These principles then are
implemented into linguistics and produce cross-linguistic Preferences that are
scalar and violable such as "CV is the best/ most natural syllable,
anything that departs from it will be less frequent/ more marked, diachronic
evolution and acquisition strive toward CV." The area of Government
Phonology that bears a similar conflict resolving system is consonantal
lenition/ fortition. We have proposed in the Coda Mirror (Ségéral & Scheer
2001) that a consonant potentially experiences two distinct and antagonistc
forces, i.e. Government (the evil one) and Licensing (the good one): Government
inhibits the melodic expression of its target, while Licensing backs it up. This
system defines four and only four logical combinations, i.e. 1) [+gov, +lic],
2) [+gov, -lic], 3) [-gov, +lic], 4) [-gov, -lic]. 1) = intervocalic consonant,
2) = impossible, 3) = the Strong Position = word-initially and after a Coda, 4)
= in Coda position. The effects of the resulting positional plight or ease are various
and gradual: cross-linguistic observation allows to assign gradual strength/
weakness the four positions mentioned: consonants are the strongest in 3) (the
Coda Mirror) and the weakest in 4) (the Coda), 1) (the intervocalic position)
being intermediate, but more often on the weak side of 4). Note that this scale
is not absolute but relative: we do not claim that there can never be any
lenition in 3) (the Coda Mirror), nor that there can never be any fortition in
4) (the Coda). These are events that may occur, but we do not expect them to be
frequent. What we do firmly rule out is that any higher ranked position on the
strength scale does undergo some lenition, while lower ranked positions do not.
Or, that any lower ranked position experiences strengthening, but the higher
ranked ones do not.
Now let us look at
the potential differences between the Natural Phonology approach and our own
scenario. 1. we do make hard predictions and define the conditions under which
our system is falsified, cf. above. For example, we hold that a language where consonants
spirantize in Codas and in the Strong position, but not intervocalically, is
not human. We do not see how any logically possible pattern can ever be ruled
out by the kind of higher principles of Natural Phonology that have been
mentioned. That is, the balance may go way towards the expected natural centre
of gravitation (strict CV languages), but a hypothetical language where words
must begin with at least 5 consonants will not be declared impossible. Rather,
it will be viewed as improbable. 2. this leads us to another difference: there
does not seem to be any such thing as the notion of "possible
language" in Natural Phonology. Linguistic structures are not possible/ well-formed
or impossible/ ill-formed, but just more or less probable: this is the very
essence of what a Preference is. This property is shared by OT ("I assure
you, this constraint exists in the brain of every human being, but
unfortunately you can never see it in any language because it is so low
ranked"). In other words, nothing is ever discrete, linguistic structures
are only gradual. By contrast, we have shown how the two antagonistic forces
Government and Licensing build a network which is 1) predictive, 2) discrete
and 3) splits the logically possible area into "human" and
"non-human". 3. we believe that the non-discreteness, the
non-predictiveness and the absence of conditions of falsification in Natural
Phonology stem from its non-linguistic foundations. Dziubalska-Kolaczyk
(2001:73) writes: "in Natural Linguistics linguistic preferences are
explanatory since they are derived from non-linguistic levels", and p.74
"Preferences of Natural Linguistics are explicitly based on
extralinguistic fundaments." And indeed, the higher principles invoked
which govern the linguistic implementation of Preferences make no reference to
linguistics at all: being natural means being "cognitively simple, easily
accessible (especially to children), elementary and therefore universally
preferred, i.e. derivable from human nature, or unmarked/ less marked"
(Dressler 1999:135). We hold that any scientific theory must be predictive and falsifiable.
Moreover, we believe that the human brain is not equipped for handling
graduality: all objects that are manipulated by our cognitive system are
discrete. One aspect of the Chomskian research programme is to explain how
"infinite states can arise from finite means". 4. the foregoing
paragraph actually provides good illustration why Natural Phonology falls
outside of the generative paradigm: in the philosophical debate between
empiricists and mentalists, it stands on the empiricist side. That is,
"nothing in language is specifically linguistic". Rather, linguistic
behaviour is but one facet of more general human behaviour, i.e. the strive
toward naturality. Therefore, Natural Phonology has to deny the existence of
any specifically linguistic endowment that is transmitted by the human genetic
code: infants do not build on any linguistic knowledge in order to acquire
natural language. Rather, the capacities that they use in order to acquire
language are of more general, non-linguistic kind (induction, categorization
etc.). They are the same as those that are used for the acquisition of bipedal
movement or the ability to drive a car. Thereby, Natural Phonology takes the
behaviouristic stance, in both acquisition and adult practice of natural
language. 5. but Natural Phonology does not only fall outside of the generative
paradigm. It appears that it is also incompatible with the Saussurian insight
that has grounded modern linguistics. Saussure holds that there is a level of
analysis (Langue) that obeys exclusively its own rule and remains entirely
unaffected by any external influence that may arise through social pressure
etc. (Parole). Not only does such a level that is purely lingusitic and obeys
only the linguistic rule exist, but the study of language, says Saussure,
cannot possibly succeed if this level, i.e. the Langue, is not studied independently
and before all other things. The Chomskian equivalent, of course, is
competence/ I-language vs. performance/ E-language. Now the higher principles
that control the content of Preferences in Natural Phonology clearly fall into
the Parole, if anything: they are non-linguistic. It thus appears that Natural
Phonology denies the existence of the Saussurian opposition Langue vs. Parole
since nothing in language is Langue, and hence no such thing is genetically
encoded, which means that infants do not use any such information in order to
acquire natural language.
We realize that we
may have misconstrued some of the aspects of Natural Phonology as stated above,
and we would be happy to learn through discussion in Poznan in which way we are
mistaken or imprecise.
References
Dressler, Wolfgang
U. 1999. What is Natural in Natural Morphology (NM)? Prague Linguistic Circle
Papers 3, 135-144.
Dziubalska-Kolaczyk, Katarzyna. 2001. Phonotactic
constraints and preferences. Constraints and Preferences, edited by Katarzyna
Dziubalska-Kol''aczyk, 69-100. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Ségéral, Philippe
& Tobias Scheer. 2001. La Coda-Miroir. Bulletin de la Société de
Linguistique de Paris 96, 107-152. Older English version available at http://www.unice.fr/dsl/tobias.htm.