

Pragmatic intrusion into what is said and beyond: explicature, pragmatically enriched 'said', implicature or implicature?

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On a classical Gricean account, meaning or the total signification of an utterance is divided into what is said and what is conversationally implicated. But to work out what is said, one has to (i) resolve reference, (ii) fix deixis, (iii) disambiguate expressions, (iv) unpack ellipsis and (v) narrow generalities (Grice 1989, Levinson 2000). It turns out, however, that the determination of (i) - (v) involves pragmatic inference of some kind. In other words, there is pragmatic intrusion involved in the working out of what is said and beyond. The question that arises next is what is the pragmatic intrusion under consideration? Roughly, two current positions can be identified. The first is that the pragmatic intrusion is of a special kind, which differs from conversational implicature. Within this camp, three lines of arguments are of particular interest. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1993), the pragmatic inference is an 'explicature'. Secondly, there is the position taken by Recanati (1993, 2003, 2004) that it is the pragmatically enriched part of what is said. A third argument is due to Bach (1994, 2004), in which he proposed a third category of communicative content, intermediate between what is said and what is implicated. Bach dubbed the vehicle of such a content 'implicature', because it is implicit in what is said. The second position is represented by Levinson (2000) (see also Huang's 1991, 1994, 2000, 2004a neo-Gricean pragmatic analyses of anaphora). Within the neo-Gricean framework (e.g. Levinson 2000, Huang 1991, 1994, 2000, 2003, 2004a, b), Levinson argued that these so-called explicatures/pragmatically enriched 'said'/implicatures result from exactly the same pragmatic apparatus that engenders conversational implicatures. Therefore, they are the same beast as conversational implicatures. In this paper, I shall provide a critical overview of the four accounts based on original observations and analyses, as articulated in Huang (2006), arguing that the neo-Gricean implicature account is the most plausible one from both a conceptual and an empirical point of view. Data will be drawn from a few languages.

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