

TOWARDS A CONTRASTIVE PRAGMALINGUISTICS*

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INTRODUCTION

There are a number of important aspects of language behaviour which are not amenable to the theories and procedures of classical Contrastive Analysis. In particular Contrastive Analysis has failed to deal with problems of meaning, language use and the various linguistic aspects of interaction. One reaction to this state of affairs is the attempt being made to develop the semantic component of Contrastive Generative Grammars (cf. KRZESZOWSKI 1972, 1976), and it does indeed seem that valuable insights may be gained thereby.

Another reaction, though, has been to turn away from meaning as represented by deep structures "inside" sentences and to investigate it instead as it is manifested in social acts "outside" sentences. The focus of such an approach is not on the theories, models and data of linguistic structures but on the social patterning of discourse and interaction. For the Pragmalinguist, then, it is language functions rather than linguistic structures — discourse, not grammar, the communicative act in context, not the sentence in isolation — which are central to his investigation.

Can the Contrastive Analyst benefit from such an approach? Is the work being done in Pragmatics (as well as in related fields such as Discourse Analysis, Social Psychology, Sociology) of value to him? This paper suggests that it is; indeed, it is based on the 'strong hypothesis' that Contrastive Analysis without a pragmalinguistic dimension is inadequate.

* Much of the work described in this paper has been carried out with two of my colleagues in the CRAPEL, M.J. Gremmo and H. Holec: I take this opportunity of expressing to them my affection and gratitude — whilst in no way trying to share the blame for any mistakes and over-generalisations contained herein!

This suggestion is not a new one (GLEASON 1968; HARTMANN 1977) and a valuable programmatic statement of aims and objects has been made (SAJAVAARA 1971). But when we come down to the nitty-gritty we find that, in fact, very little has been done, since no suitable model of pragmalinguistic or interactive structure has been available for the Contrastive Analyst to use even if he wanted to.

So this paper is a first, tentative step in that direction. It is possibly also over-ambitious, and wrong-headed: but it does try, through the analysis of concrete examples, (however inadequate), to make a practical and not just a theoretical contribution to the field.

I — OUTLINE OF A MODEL OF PRAGMALINGUISTICS

In this section, we will be considering very briefly a model of pragmalinguistics which has been developed at the CRAPEL over the last four years. Obviously, this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the status and scope of pragmalinguistics (see STALNAKER 1972) but one or two points need to be made if the relevance and perspective of what follows is not to be distorted.

1. *Meaning as a construct of behaviour*

We would like first to draw attention to the meaning of *meaning* as it is used here. For the pragmalinguist and the student of interaction, the traditional philosophical and semantic accounts of meaning are of little use or validity; isolated, de-contextualised objects or concepts are unsuitable tools for the description of the dynamics of communication. Rather, he sees meaning as a construct of interaction, and he studies the ways in which participants in a communicative event create, relate, organise and realise meaning in behaviour.

(As will probably be immediately obvious to the reader, the term *pragmalinguistics* is not used here in the sense in which it is used by some philosophers of language, whose main interest is restricted to the referential operations of the verbal code. (Deictics, pronouns, negations, etc.) Such an approach offers little more to the understanding of interactive meaning than does traditional semantics).

The pragmalinguist regards attempts to define *the* meaning of meaning as a Will o' the wisp: meaning for him resides in and is conveyed by the combinations and the relationship between a number of semiotic channels, and it is these operations which form the primary object of his study. He studies and attempts to account for all contributions to communicative interaction, whether verbal, paralinguistic (i.e. vocal non-verbal) or non-verbal. Semantics,

with its traditional focus on the verbal component alone, is of little help in the description and analysis of communicative behaviours involving the whole spectrum of sensory categories — paraphonology, key, intonation, gaze, facial expression, gesture, touch, smell, orientation, proxemics, as well as a myriad of social and situational features.¹

A fundamental concept for the pragmalinguist, then, is that of the *act of communication*, of which the *speech act* is simply one possible realisation. A nod of the head can communicate agreement just as efficiently as the word 'yes': so, too, can a smile and gesture, acquiescence or the right choice of intonation or key. And this is a crude, over-simplified example, since the meaning of an act of communication is often the sum total of words plus facial expression, plus key, etc., — plus all the situationally relevant features. Meaning is the relationship specified by these phenomena in combination.

This objection applies just as strongly to even the most sophisticated kind of Contrastive Generative Semantics, which still has as its object the meaning of the isolated sentence. To put it another way, a bilingual informant's intuitions about equivalence (the sort of thing one might 'get at' via the deep structures and semantic component of a contrastive TGG) will *not* be enough to satisfy the criteria for meaning discussed here: they will still only provide information about a range of possible interpretations in context. No matter how much the grammarians manage to reduce semantic vagueness, isolated sentences will always remain pragmatically vague since they lack the interactive dimension. Again, no amount of cobbling with context-sensitive rules or whatever can repair the basic premise of semantics, namely, that all meaning is internal and verbal. The meaning of face-to-face interaction is an amalgam of information from many channels and, in particular, the discourse structure is mainly marked non-verbally. No account of meaning is adequate which fails to take into consideration such vital questions as who is speaking to who? When? Where? What is the nature of their relationship? Of the circumstances? What activity are they involved in? What is its purpose and that of the communication?

At the double risk of labouring the point and of caricaturing alternative approaches, let us consider an example:

There is an oak-tree in the middle of the meadow.

This, you will agree, is the sort of sentence that often gets taken for semantic analysis. Traditional semantics has been limited to the study of propositions ('sense'). Essentially, this has meant the elaboration of rules for

¹ For a discussion of the integration of non-verbal communication into discourse analysis, see RILEY (1975, 1976); the discursive role of intonation ('key') is the subject of BRAZIL (1976).

testing the truth of propositions: with relative ease, the semanticist can set up and define classes of referent, to which he can attribute such objects as 'oak-tree' and 'meadow'. He can describe the relationship which is predicated between them, whether oak-trees are the sorts of things one finds in meadows, and so on.

But when a sentence occurs in discourse, as one of a series of utterances, it derives contextual meaning from them (or they select meanings for it). Some of these meanings *may* be connected with the constituent elements of the sentence in isolation (oak-tree, meadow, etc.) but a whole new interactive dimension is also added whose meanings cannot be predicted from the sentence in isolation. The reader is invited to imagine that he is the Sheriff-hero of a Western, who has just been captured by the Villain and a band of henchmen. The henchmen are urging their leader to hang the Hero. "Aha!" says the Villain, with a twirl of his black moustaches, "there is an oak-tree in the middle of the meadow".

However inveterate a semanticist, it is unlikely that the reader would start examining the truth of *this* utterance. Both he and the henchmen would be interested in it as a *reply* and as a *suggestion* — major meanings which it could only have in context, its meanings as a communicative act.

2. Illocution²

Within Pragmalinguistics, the study of communicative acts rests on the theory of Illocution (AUSTIN 1971; HOLEC 1975; SEARLE 1969). Communicative acts may be realised verbally, paralinguistically or non-verbally. That is, the *speech acts* to which most writers on the subject limit their attention are only one type or realisation of the wider class, communicative acts.

Communicative acts include inviting, accepting, agreeing, disagreeing, explaining, denying, suggesting, hypothesising, promising, offering, etc. The illocutionary value (or *function*) of each acts reflects directly the use which the actor ("speaker") wishes to put it to: loosely, it can often be regarded as an exteriorisation of his intention in carrying out that particular act rather than another.

The illocutionary value of communicative acts has no direct link with their formal realisation. In different contexts, a given grammatical structure may realise a wide range of functions: and, vice-versa, the same function may be realised by a wide range of different grammatical structures. Structures and functions are not in a one-to-one relationship: the point is not a new one, but it is worth exemplifying as it is the distinguishing feature of pragmatic as opposed to grammatical descriptions.

² The term is taken from AUSTIN (1971).

(i) Same form, different functions:

You're not going out

- a) *Prohibiting* — father to a child with a cold: it is raining.
- b) *Confirming* — I am reacting to the statement of a friend with a cold: he says he's staying in all day.
- c) *Threatening* — kidnappers to victim
- d) *Expressing surprise* — but I thought we were going to see this afternoon's game together!
- e) *'Stating'* — if anyone calls you'll be here to answer the door.

(ii) Same function, different forms:

Agreeing

- a) Yes, sure, right, fine, O.K., Bob's your uncle, etc.
- b) Repetition (You're leaving? I'm leaving).
- c) Nod of the head.
- d) I agree, I accept your point, I see what you mean, etc.)
- e) No, I suppose not (You say you can't do it now...)

When we talk about the 'same' form or realisation in group (i), it should be clear that we are referring to identity at one level of description only, the morpho-syntactic level. It is precisely because there will be many differences at other levels (paralinguistic, non-verbal, situational) and because these differences will result in differences of meaning, that we must go beyond the semantico-grammatical into the pragmalinguistic. To put it more bluntly, whatever the differences between the items in group (i) are they are important, and they are not grammatical.

The second important point which needs to be made is that non-verbal behaviours which realise communicative acts must necessarily be regarded as having an illocutionary function. In group (ii) above, we included the head-nod as a realisation of *agreeing*: other examples are not difficult to find —

- a) *disagreeing* with a shake of the head,
- b) *greeting* (wave and/or eyebrow flash)
- c) *declining* (e.g. by placing one's hand over a cup or glass when offered more to drink)
- d) *insulting* (e.g. giving someone the obscene V-sign)
- e) *commanding* (e.g. by beckoning to someone)

3. Some remarks on ²Non-Verbal Communicative Behaviour

Obviously, not all non-verbal behaviours have illocutionary force: those we have classed as *indices*, for example, may carry information about the participants in an interaction which is of general pragmatic interest but

which is so low on the scale of linguistiveness as to be usually irrelevant to the discourse analyst. (See RILEY 1975). The remaining non-verbal behaviours have been categorised as follows:

- (i) Those having *illocutionary force* (see above)
- (ii) *Kinematopoeias* ("illustrators")
- (iii) *Deictics*
- (iv) Regulators of *interactional tactics*:
 - turn-taking signals
 - attention signals
 - address signals

For present purposes we would like to concentrate on the non-verbal behaviours in group (iv), the regulators of interactional tactics. These behaviours are the regulative mechanisms of interaction: they govern the distribution of utterances and the transitions from speaker-state to listener-state and to addressee. They are sets of rule-governed behaviours which control the sequential structure, timing and distribution of utterances: who speaks when, and to whom. We have claimed that meaning in face-to-face interaction is a construct of behaviour: it is these behaviours and the rules which govern them which permit the negotiation between participants which is necessary if their individual contributions are to mesh at all levels, as it must do if any sort of communication is to take place.

Work by Duncan (1972, 1973) and by Kendon (1964, 1967) has described the mechanisms involved in *turn-taking*, and *attention*, particularly those concerning gaze. For example, a speaker who wishes to yield the floor will make eye-contact with his interlocutor immediately before the end of his utterance. Other NV behaviours which may accompany or replace gaze here have also been identified and described: they include a number of postural and gesticular behaviours, creaky voice, low key and cessation of body movement.

By *address* we mean that rule-governed set of verbal or non-verbal behaviours by means of which a 'speaker' selects and indicates his Addressee(s) in groups above the dyad.³ When we interact in a group, we do not usually speak to all the group all the time, we speak to individuals or sub-groups. We have identified the following non-verbal behaviours as operating in the address system: eye-contact, head direction, orientation, posture and gesture. (Of course, address may also be realised verbally — "Would you like some tea, *Mary?*" — and indeed the choice of verbal address is proving to be a surprisingly useful marker for certain types of discourse).

³ By Addressee we mean the participant (s) upon whom the Speaker imposes the duty/right to reply.

Address is a very simple behavioural system: it is also an extremely powerful descriptive tool. By observing address behaviour we are able to state accurately which participant(s) a speaker is "speaking to" for any given utterance. This means that we now have a way of coding utterances, or, rather *turns*, in all types of interaction. By distinguishing for each turn (1, 2, 3...) which participant (W, X, Y, Z...) is the Speaker (S), the Addressee(s) (A), the Listener(s) (L), we are able to code each turn in terms of *participant* states.

Since *address* (though not necessarily the behavioural mechanism which realises it) is a *universal* the Contrastive Analyst is now in a position to compare many important aspects of the discourse structure of different languages (An example is given below). Patterns of consecutive codings, expressed in terms of (1) The codings themselves, (2) Change of address and (3) Change of first Speaker, give us discourse units of varying types, corresponding to exchanges/transactions etc. As we try to demonstrate below, such descriptions provide us with valuable formalisations of social role, participant states, formality and situation, i.e. with information concerning precisely those non-semantic parameters of meaning which, it is the Pragmalinguist's contention, are essential to a description of interactive discourse.

4. Outline of a Model of Discourse

The considerations discussed above concerning

- (i) Meaning as a construct of interaction
- (ii) Illocution
- (iii) Non-verbal communication

lead us towards a model of discourse (and eventually to a model of interaction) which differs radically from most others which have been put forward.⁴ In very general terms, our work on the structures of written and spoken discourse has led us to the conclusion that, as one passes from discourse which is written, prepared and non-interactive to discourse which is spoken, spontaneous and interactive, structuration depends less and less on the ordering of the propositional content and more and more on the nature of the transaction. (RILEY 1975; ABE et al. 1975; DUDA 1974; ABE, DUDA & GREMMO 1977).


The investigator of authentic, spontaneous, spoken discourse who tries to base his analysis on a logical approach to propositional content is in for a rough time. Rather, we believe that the only practical approach is via the two other features of spoken discourse which we have already looked at briefly, namely

- (i) illocution
- (ii) non-verbal behaviours

⁴ With the exception of WIDDOWSON (1977), where a tripartite division, very similar to the one suggested here, is also posited.

We can, that is, describe such discourse as a sequence of illocutionary acts and as a series of interactive acts. Such a distinction is all the more necessary when we consider that much non-verbal behaviour has *no* illocutionary value, its function being the regulation and marking of discourse structure. This gives us *illocutionary structure* (or "communicative" structure) and an *interactive structure* (or "discursive" structure). Since elements of the two structures are not in a one-to-one relationship, we may treat them as simultaneous but parallel.

Such an approach to discourse structure might be diagrammed in the following way:



By *Formal Structure* here we mean *realisation*: the set of message-bearing elements (verbal, paralinguistic, non-verbal) in a situation. These elements have substance and are realisations of various systems and structures whose organisation can be described in terms such as class, units, structure and distribution. The textual function of such elements is described in terms of their internal relations (and without reference to the meaning they carry).

Illocutionary Structure: here we deal with sequences of illocutionary acts (e.g. Inviting, Accepting, Confirming, Thanking). There is no one-to-one relationship between these acts and units of formal structure i.e. they are *not* related at different levels of delicacy.

Interactive Structure: here we describe linguistic organisation in terms of interactional tactics: turns (opening, reply, closing) address, relative distribution of utterances (exchange, transaction). There is no one-to-one relationship between interactive acts and illocutionary acts.

It may help clarify this set of distinctions if we take an example: let us imagine that Mr. and Mrs. A. wish to ask the way in London: they approach a stranger, Mr. B., and the following dialogue ensues:

1. Mr. A. : Sorry, but can you tell us the way to St. James' Park, please?
2. Mr. B. : Are you on foot?
3. Mrs. A. : Yes, we are. Is it far?
4. Mr. B. : Then you just go down those steps there and turn right.
5. Mr. A. : Thank you very much.

The *Illocutionary Structure* here is

1. Requesting information
2. Requesting information
3. Informing, Requesting information
4. Informing
5. Thanking

The *Interactive Structure* is

1. Opening) Exchange)
2. Response))
3. Opening)) Transaction
4. Response) Exchange)
5. Closing))
5. Closing))

	1	2	3	4	5
Mr. A.	S	A	H	H	S
Mrs. A.	H	H	S	A	H
Mr. B.	A	S	A	S	H
	O R		O R		

An important theoretical point can be made here:

By distinguishing between these two types of act, the difficulty of handling the discursive embedding exemplified here is greatly reduced, since we do not need to define illocutionary acts by their place in structure. If that were the case, we would need, for example, a different definition of Requesting information for each of the first three places in the structure of this dialogue.

II - CONTRASTIVE APPLICATIONS

What use is this type of approach to the Contrastive Analyst? We can only hope to give hints, suggestions here, but we will make them as concrete as possible:

- I. (a) We can compare the range of functions which a structure in one language can realise with the range of functions a similar structure in another language can realise.

Let us take an example: in French, English and Swedish there is a structure If+(si, om) "conditional" clause. Observation leads us to the conclusion that the French structure can be used to realise at least three different functions:

- (i) *Hypothesising*
S'il arrive, je le lui dirai.

(ii) *Requesting confirmation*

Si je suis prêt? (C'est bien ce que tu viens de me demander?)

(iii) *Suggesting*

Et si on allait au cinéma ce soir!

If we turn to colloquial Finnish-Swedish, we find that there too, the 'om and conditional' structure can realise these three functions:

(a) Om han kommer, ska jag berätta det för honom

(b) Om jag är färdig? (Jo, jo!)

(c) Om vi sku' gå på bio i kväll!

However, when we turn to English, we find a very different kettle of fish!

(a) If he comes, I'll tell him

(b)* If I am ready?

(c)* If we go the cinema this evening

Note what the asterisk means here: these perfectly correct grammatical constructions can not (=do not) function as *requests for confirmation* or *suggestions*.

The implications for Contrastive Analysis are considerable: any syllabus aiming at communicative competence will have to take such correspondences into account.

One could argue that Contrastive Analysis could start at an even more primitive level, that of *ethno-discourse*, i.e. those sets of presuppositions which speakers impose upon the reality their language dissects. However, although some extremely interesting work has been done by the ethnolinguists, anthropologists and socio-linguists, (FISHMAN 1971; GUMPERZ & HYMES 1972; LABOV 1972a and b; SUDNOW 1972) very little of it is sufficiently rigorous from the point of view of linguistic science and, to the best of our knowledge, no directly contrastive studies have been made on such a basis. Simply as an illustration of the lines such a contrast might take, let us examine the following exchange:

Child: Dad, I want to go to the match

Parent: I'm busy this afternoon in the garden

Now it is quite clear (to anyone who shares the presuppositions of these speakers' culture) that the Child is *Requesting* — "Please will you take me to the match" and the Parent is *Refusing* — "No, I can't". Yet if we took these two utterances separately, we would have no reason for labelling or interpreting them thus. It is their juxtaposition, their relationship in context which enables us to interpret them as acts of communication by bringing to bear on them the presuppositions of our ethno-discourse. Even for such a brief example it is difficult

to list the presuppositions exhaustively: a whole society is reflected in the word 'match' alone. Some of the presuppositions are startlingly obvious — which is just why we need them:

(i) The child cannot or does not wish to go alone

(ii) The parent can be expected to take the child

(iii) The parent is responsible for the child in some way

(iv) The parent has priority of choice

(v) The parent cannot be in two places simultaneously

(vi) It is possible for non-players to attend, etc. etc.,

It is important to remember, though, that there are societies where (ii) and (iii) would by no means seem obvious, for example. And why did the reader probably interpret this as a father/son exchange, not a mother/daughter one? And why might the author be thinking of a cricket match, but probably not the reader?

Child: Maman, tu m'achètes un nouveau sous-pull?

Parent: Ton pere dit que ça coûte trop cher.

Here again, we have Requesting-Refusing exchange, but a number of the presuppositions which enable us to identify it as such are different (e.g. Mother buys, Father pays: one cannot buy items which are too expensive, etc). By accumulating and analysing a large corpus of such exchanges, one would hope to define the elements of the ethno-discourse and a cross-cultural comparison would then be possible.

It is important to distinguish between two types of presupposition: the *knowledge of events* which individuals have, and may share, and which enables us to account for certain logico-semantic aspects of discourse structure in terms of A, B and A/B events, and the *knowledge of the universe* which is shared by all members of a speech community by virtue of their speaking the same language. This is not the place to discuss the Whorf-Sapir-Bernstein hypothesis that the language we use segments reality and our perception of the world: but the applied work by perceptual psychologists is beginning to reveal ways in which such problems can be studied objectively. In Berlin & Kay (1969) colour terms and perceptions in a wide range — of languages were compared and contrasted and Strömnes (1977) has carried out a contrastive study of the spatial relationships in Finnish and Swedish. There seems no reason why such techniques should not be applied to certain other notions such as time, size, order and growth.

(b) Let us now reverse the process: this time let us take one particular function — *Suggesting* — and look at some of the various realisations

which can occur (in the same three languages):

- French — Et si on allait au cinéma ce soir.
On pourrait peut-être aller au cinéma ce soir.
Vous n'auriez pas envie d'aller au cinéma ce soir.
Une possibilité serait d'aller au cinéma ce soir.
- Swedish — Jag tänkte att vi kunde gå på bio i kväll.
Hor skulle det vara att gå på bio i kväll?
Vi kunde gå på bio i kväll, eller hur?
Om vi skulle gå på bio i kväll!
- English — How about us going to the cinema this evening?
I tell you what, let's go to the cinema this evening.
Why don't we go to the cinema this evening.
I wouldn't mind going to the cinema this evening.

This list is by no means exhaustive, of course, but it fully confirms the logical points that a communicative syllabus cannot be based on a structural progression and that comparisons of this type will provide immediately useful data.

An extremely interesting and important question will be to see whether there are functions which may be realised in, say, the verbal component of language A, but which are realised in the paralinguistic or non-verbal components of language B. Work on intonation and key seems to indicate strongly that this is indeed the case, as does our own work on non-verbal communication. However, to the best of our knowledge, little specifically contrastive work has been done on this problem.

- (e) This time, instead of taking sentences/functions in isolation let us consider them in sequence; that is, we are going to look at illocutionary structure. Obviously an enormous amount of descriptive work still remains to be done before such comparisons influence syllabus design: only after corpora of authentic recordings have been analysed can we hope to have the accurate data essential to a valid contrast. But, in principle, there seems to be nothing to stop us proceeding as follows:

English dialogue:

- (1) That's a very pretty dress you're wearing.
(2) Oh, thank you very much.

Illocutionary structure: compliment+thanks.

Swedish dialogue:

- (1) En så vacker klänning du har!
(2) Tack så mycket

Illocutionary structure: compliment+thanks

French dialogue:

- (1) Que c'est jolie, la robe que tu portes!
(2)

Illocutionary structure: compliment+

Further examination would show that a French Compliment is never followed by an expression of thanks (a form such as *Merçi beaucoup* occurring in this context would not be interpreted as thanks but might be as ironic commentary).

Such variations in illocutionary structure can, of course, be spread over much larger stretches of time. A hostess in Finland, for example, will expect to have to invite her guests to take their places at table at least three times: to all concerned, anything less would be an unseemly rush! Again, she would expect her guests, when they next met, to begin their conversation by thanking her for her entertainment (*Tack för senast/Kiitos viimesestä*) even if several *months* had elapsed between the two encounters. Neither in French nor English society is this usually the case. Examples of this sort abound; e.g. when entering a shop the Frenchman usually greets the other customers (*Bonjour Messieurs-Dames*): so does a German entering a railway compartment. But anyone who entered an English railway compartment or shop and proclaimed "Good morning, ladies and gentlemen" would get a distinctly frosty reception (unless he happened to be the ticket-collector). Again, a Frenchman attending a seminar or committee meeting with English speakers almost always manages to give the impression that he is slightly aggressive, over-categorical, "pushy": in fact, entry strategies in such situations differ considerably between the two languages, both in realisation and *modalisation*. Indeed, the whole structure of such meetings clearly differs from one side of the Channel to the other — but we will only know *how* exactly when the necessary detailed analyses have been carried out, and this is true of dozens of other situations including business negotiations, telephone calls, casual encounters, etc., etc.

By identifying foreign language learning needs and objectives in terms of the uses to which the learners will wish to put their language, it is hoped that more motivating and effective language programmes will be developed. At least, this is the rationale behind the Council of Europe-sponsored research into the Threshold Level/Le Niveau Seuil (Council of Europe, 1975, 1976) and indeed behind the whole movement towards "Communicative" or "Functional" Syllabuses. However, it is our contention that little of contrastive value will be produced as long as the confusion between *notions* and *illocutionary forces*, and between *illocutionary acts* and *interactional acts* continues.

2. *An example*

Let us now try our hands at a bit of contrastive pragmalinguistics. For analysis, we have chosen two passages of approximately the same length. In Passage A, an English teacher is preparing two French students, Mme. X and M. Z., to practice a dialogue. In Passage B, a French teacher is preparing a group of immigrant workers to do the same sort of thing. Intuitively, we regard these passages (which are both authentic) as "similar" in some way that is not just related to the content, but to deeper patterns of interaction and role.

PASSAGE A:

(The target discourse dialogue being prepared was:
"Can you tell me the way to Victoria Station, please".
"Certainly, it's down there on the right").

1. Teacher : Right... the bottom of the page, then... whose turn is it? Mme.X.
2. Mme X. : Is my turn? What —
3. Teacher : Is it my turn?
4. Mme? X. : Is it my turn?
5. Teacher : Good. Yes, I think it was.
6. Mme. X. : What means 'the way'?
7. Teacher : Anyone?
8. M. Y. : Le chemin, montrer le chemin.
9. Teacher : le chemin, right, good.
10. Mme. X. : "Can you tell me the way to Victoria Station, please?"
- 11./12. Teacher : Fine... M. Z?
13. M. Z. : "Certainly, it's down there, on the right".

If we analyse this passage from the point of view of its *illocutionary structure*, we get the following:

INTERACTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PASSAGE A

1. *Framing* *Directing* *Requesting information* *Nominating*
Right bottom of the page then whose turn is it Mme X?
2. *Requesting confirmation*
Is my turn? What —
3. *Correcting*
Is it my turn?
4. *Practicing*
Is it my turn?
5. *Evaluating* *Confirming*
Good Yes, I think it was

6. *Requesting information*
What means "the way"
7. *Performative*
Anyone?
8. *Informing*
Le chemin, montrer le chemin.
9. *Confirming, evaluating*
le chemin, right, good
10. *Practicing*
Can you tell me the way to Victoria Station, please?
11. *Evaluating* 12. *Nominating*
Fine... M. Z.?
13. *Practicing*
Certainly, it's down there on the right.

The same passage analysed in terms of its *interactional structure* (in accordance with the system described above pp. 15) gives us the following profile:

ILLOCUTIONARY STRUCTURE OF PASSAGE A

participant \ Turn	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Teacher	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	S	A
Mme. X.	A	S	A	S	A	S	H	H	A	S	H	H	H
M. Y.	H	H	H	H	H	H	A	S	H	H	H	H	H
M. Z.	H	H	H	H	H	H	A	H	H	H	H	A	S

Legend: 1, 2, 3, etc. — turns ("interactional acts") in serial order (each turn may contain several *illocutionary acts*).

S — Speaker

A — Addressee (s)

H — Hearer (s)

1 2	3 4	5 6	7 8	9 10	11	12 13
O R	O R	O R	O R	O R	C	O R
Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange						Exchange
transaction						

O=Opening, R=Reply, C=Closing (No *duty to reply* is imposed by the speaker on any other participant i.e. there is no address).

Turning to passage B, we carry out the same analysis. (The target discourse being prepared was: "Tiens, bonjour Bashir"

"Bonjour Iovan"

Bashir and *Iovan* are names of characters in the text book.)

PASSAGE B:

1. Teacher : Ca va. Je commence maintenant. "Tiens, bonjour Bashir". Tu es Iovan, Ali.
2. Student (Ali) : "Tiens, bonjour Bashir".
- 3/4. Teacher : Très bien. Maintenant Bashir dit à Iovan: "Bonjour Iovan". Tu es Bashir.
5. Student 2 : "Bonjour, tiens bonjour Iovan".
6. Teacher : Il ne dit pas "tiens", c'est Iovan qui dit "tiens bonjour Bashir". Maintenant Bashir dit simplement "bonjour"
7. Student 2 : "Bonjour"
8. Teacher : Il s'appelle comment?
9. Student 3 : Iovan
10. Teacher : (Gesture to student 2 to try again)
11. Student 2 : "Bonjour Iovan"
- 12/13. Teacher : Très bien. Alors, tu es Iovan, tu es Bashir, Allez-là
14. Student 4 : "Tiens, bonjour Bashir"
15. Teacher : Bashir
16. Student 5 : "Bonjour, Iovan"
17. Teacher : Très bien.

ILLOCUTIONARY STRUCTURE OF PASSAGE B

1. *Framing Performative* *Modelling* *Nominating*
Ca va? Je commence maintenant. "Tiens, bonjour Bashir". Tu es Iovan, Ali.
2. *Practicing*
"Tiens, bonjour Bashir"
3. *Evaluating* 4. *Modelling* *Nominating*
Très bien Maintenant Bashir dit à Iovan, "bonjour Iovan". Tu es Bashir.
5. *Practicing*
"Bonjour, tiens, bonjour Iovan"
6. *Correcting*
Il ne dit pas 'tiens', c'est Iovan qui dit "tiens, bonjour Bashir".
Maintenant Bashir dit simplement - bonjour ...
7. *Practicing*
"bonjour"
8. *Correcting*
Il s'appelle comment?
9. *Informing*
Iovan
10. [NVC : address and gesture- *Nominating* 2]
11. *Practicing*
"Bonjour Iovan"

12. *Evaluating* 13. *Nominating* *Directing*
Très bien Alors tu es Iovan, tu es Bashir. Allez-là
14. *Practicing* 15. *Nominating* 16. *Practicing*
"Tiens bonjour Bashir" Bashir "Bonjour Iovan"
17. *Evaluating*
Très bien

INTERACTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PASSAGE B

Participant \ Turn	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Teacher	S	A	S	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	S	A	S	A	S
Student 1	A	S	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Student 2	H	H	H	A	S	A	S	H	H	A	S	H	H	H	H	H	H
Student 3	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	A	S	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Student 4	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	A	S	H	H	H
Student 5	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	A	H	A	S	H

O R C O R O R O R O R C O R O R C
 Ex. Ex. Ex. Ex. Ex. Ex. Ex. Ex.
 Trans. Transaction Transaction

O=Opening (A Speaker turn in which (a) participant(s) is addressed i.e. the duty to reply is imposed on him).

R=Reply

C=Closing (A Speaker turn performed by the same participant as the 'O', but in which no duty to reply is imposed).

How are we to interpret and contrast these two sets of data? ⁵ If the claims we have made earlier have any justification, our analyses would provide us with insights into the illocutionary repertoire and structure, the nature of the interaction and discourse, and the presuppositions and social roles of the participants.

For what it is worth, let us first look at a few statistics:

(i) Types of Illocutionary Act occurring in

	PASSAGE A	PASSAGE B
Occurring only in A	(Requesting information) 2 (Requesting confirmation) 1 (Confirming) 2 Framing 1	Occurring only in B (Modelling) 1 Framing 1 Directing 2 Nominating 5

⁵ We ask the reader to accept the fictions that it is possible to generalise on the basis of such a small corpus and in particular that the labels for illocutionary acts (e.g. 'Directing') have been validly defined, whereas in reality that can only be done after far more analyses of this type have been carried out.

Directing	1	Correcting	2
Nominating	2	Practicing	6
Correcting	1	Evaluating	3
Practicing	3	Performative	1
Evaluating	1	Informing	1
Performative	1		22
Informing	1		
Total	18		

(ii) *Distributions*

performed by Teacher:	12	Teacher:	15
performed by Students:	6	Students:	7
Types:	10	Types:	9

Total types A+B : 12

Teacher Acts:

Only in A:	(Framing: 1 (Directing: 1 (Confirming: 2 Requesting information: 1 Nominating: 2 Correcting: 1 Evaluating: 3 Performative: 1	Only in B (Only in B)	(Modelling: 1 Framing: 1 Directing: 2 Nominating: 5 Correcting: 2 Evaluating: 3 Performative: 1
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Student Acts:

Practicing: 3 Informing: 1 Requesting confirmation: 1 Requesting information: 1	Practicing: 6 Informing: 1
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What does all this tell us? Firstly, that our intuition that these two passages were similar was a reasonable one: 8 types of act are common to both passages, out of a total of 12 types, accounting for 32 acts out of the 40 acts occurring in the two passages together.

Secondly, the observer is struck by the very clear preponderance of Teacher Acts in both passages: a ratio of almost exactly 2 : 1. This confirms what we already know about the proportion of teacher-talk in the classroom, but the familiarity of the observation should not blind us to the important implications in terms of discourse structure and social roles. This is strongly underlined by the very clear distinction between the *types* of acts performed by the teachers and the *types* of acts performed by the students: there is only *one* example of a 'common' act ('Requesting information' in Passage A). All other acts are exclusively part of the teacher's role or the students' role. The teachers

are the only participants who can Frame, Direct, Nominate, Correct, Evaluate, Confirm (A), Model (B), or Perform. We believe that 'role' is to be defined in terms of (i) *acts performed* by a participant (ii) the discourse rights to produce a particular set of acts. (cf. GREMMO, HOLEC, RILEY forthcoming).

What we have here, then, is a clear acceptance by all participants of the traditional roles of Teacher and Student. The event is teacher-centred in every possible sense: his role and status are clearly reflected in his discourse rights. The reader can easily check for himself just how deeply engrained our understanding of this behaviour is, by trying to imagine what would happen if one of the students performed a Teacher Act, such as Directing or Evaluating or even Framing. It would be perceived as a challenge to the Teacher (or as humour, perhaps).

The teacher is model, judge and organiser of the discourse. The teaching-learning process is seen as his to control, and it is something which occurs strictly between him and the students, never between the students themselves.

At the level of Illocutionary Structure (i.e. sequences of illocutionary acts) we can make the following generalisations: both the passages are characterised by patterns of acts which can be summarized as follows:

	A	B
1.	Teacher : Framing, Directing, Requesting Information, Nominating, Performative	Framing, Performing, Modelling, Nominating, Directing
2.	Student : Requesting confirmation/information, Practicing, Informing	Practicing, Informing
3.	Teacher : Correcting, Evaluating, Confirming	Evaluating, Correcting

This is, in fact, very clear confirmation of the "Three-part exchange" described by Sinclair & Coulthard (1975). There is no need to labour the point that there is considerable congruence between the two analyses: in both cases the teacher presents material and then solicits a response, which he then judges satisfactory/unsatisfactory. If it is satisfactory he solicits a new response; if unsatisfactory, he corrects it and the student produces a new response which is judged in turn.

Let us now turn to the interpretation of our analyses of these same two passages in terms of interactional acts (cf p.p 8 - 9). Easily the most striking characteristic of both discourse networks (as we call these series of codings) is the teacher's *centrality*. This is a characteristic of his role (as seen by all

participants). He is the Paris of centralised France — wherever you want to go, you go via Paris. Whether he likes it or not, the teacher is continually being forced to reply because he is addressed by his students. This is a characteristic of *status* (as seen by his students). Getting them to address one another will be a pre-requisite, then, to a reduction of teacher-talk, which in turn will mean a change in the role and status of the teacher, since, in traditional classes such as this, students are discouraged from speaking amongst themselves.

In interactive terms, the teacher has the *right of address* (conferred on him by his status and role). That is, he — and he alone — chooses who is to speak next. It follows, logically enough, that the teacher will have alternative turns (clearly seen in the top line of each network) so that there is a superficial resemblance to dyadic interaction. The relative degree of *freedom of address* in a classroom is a function of social *directivity*: both teachers here may be said to be highly directive, since they allow no freedom at all.

Another crucial teacher-privilege is his right to organise the discourse through interactive *performatives*, i.e. acts which structure the discourse itself, usually explicitly. Centrality, Address and structuring privileges (realised by acts such as Framing, Directing, Nominating, Performing, Requesting information) all combine to give the Teacher a high degree of discursive *control*.

In A 3, the Teacher interrupts Mme. X.: now interruptions can be classified in discourse terms according to (i) whether they are in-or between—terms, exchanges etc., and (ii) whether the Addressee of the Interruptor was the previous turn's A, A or H. Here we have an in-turn interruption — Mme. X. is not allowed to finish what she was saying. This is perfectly acceptable in the classroom: it is part of the teacher's discursive privileges, a concomitant of his right to correct (a characteristic of role, again) but one which would be unacceptable in many other types of discourse. Indeed, the characteristic of *formality* can usefully be described by (inter alia) the types and frequencies of interruptions occurring in a given discourse (although this point is illustrated only once in our examples).

The fact that very little difference is to be discovered between these two passages should not detract from the point that a valid contrast, based on objectively observable behaviours has been made.

We would claim, then, that we have here a series of extremely useful formalisations: aspects of (i) Role (ii) Status (iii) Directivity, (iv) Formality have all been formalised in terms of interactional behaviour, and the discourse privileges of the participants. Moreover, the structure of the interaction into hierarchically-ordered units (act, exchange, transaction) is also clearly demonstrated. Since these descriptions are applicable to any face-to-face oral discourse, the add an interesting new weapon to the Contrastive Analyst's armoury.

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