

COMPLEMENTATION IN MOD GREEK AND ENGLISH

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1. *The complementizers*

Modern Greek complement clauses no doubt deserve a whole thesis. The present article will therefore be rather sketchy since it constitutes only a part of a whole thesis. We shall be dealing with the following complementizers: (a) *na*, which is also a Mood marker; (b) *oti* (pos) which corresponds to the English complementizer 'that'; (c) *pu*, 'that' used mainly with Emotive Factive predicates (see sections on "Factives" and particularly on "Assertives" where all predicates are classified according to their syntactic and semantic properties).

1.1 *Some Facts*

Modern Greek has lost its infinitive construction, which English still retains; it has never had gerundive forms like the English -ing; so, we shall mainly deal with what Chomsky (1973) has called 'tensed sentences'.¹ Since person is morphologically copied onto the endings of the verb, it is hardly plausible to talk of Equi-NP deletion, that is, there is no reason to postulate an NP subject since NP subjects are optional, as I have shown in Kakouriotis (1978). Thus the English sentence: 'I want to come' is translated into Modern Greek as *thelo na ertho*, where both the matrix and the complement verb show with their identical endings -o that they both have as their subject the 1st person sign personal pronoun *eyo* 'I'.

¹ The only exception being the non-finite adverbial participle when used as a complement of some "emotive" predicates. In such cases the complement-participle is normally a verb of perception, knowing, learning:

xarika vlepondas se
I was glad seeing you
I was glad to see you

On the other hand, in the case of a complement clause with a non-split subject, such as the English

- (1) a I want you to come
its Greek equivalent will be
(1) b *θelo na erθis*

where the difference of verb endings between matrix and complement verbs shows that we have different subjects: 1st person in the matrix and 2nd (here singular) in the complement. *na* is the Modern Greek complementizer corresponding to the English 'to'; it is here followed by what traditional grammars call the Subjective Mood. Whether there is a Subjunctive in Modern Greek is, however, debatable. As A. Martinet has pointed out "We could not speak of a subjunctive in a language which does not possess subjunctive forms that are distinct from those of the indicative such as 'je sache' and 'je sais'". (A. Martinet (1960:45), English translation). Modern Greek does not seem to have such a distinction and the endings *-ω, -εις, -ει, -ουμε, -ετε, -ου, -ου, -ου*, can occur in either Mood. What distinguishes Indicative from Subjunctive are the Mood Markers (MM) *na, tha, and as* which cliticize to the verb that follows.

Actually, as far as *na* is concerned, it can be used with either Subjunctive Aorist or Indicative Aorist or Subjunctive Perfect or Perfect Indicative. Notice that the Aorist Indicative and the Present Perfect Subjunctive are at least in one sense synonymous and can be used indiscriminately:

- (2) *elpizo na eftase soos ke avlavis.*
(Ind)
I hope MM he-reached safe and sound
I hope that the arrived safe and sound.
(3) *elpizo na exi ftasi soos ke avlavis,*
(Subj.)
I-hope MM has reached safe and sound.

But since the Perfect subjunctive and the *na* +Aorist Indicative are used interchangeably and since *na* +Subjunctive can have the same function as *na* + Indicative, is it really necessary to postulate a Subjunctive Mood? However, I should think that for our description it is convenient to postulate a periphrastic subjunctive made up of MM (Mood Marker) + Indicative, which might enable us to cover also cases like *elpizo na eftase*.

1.2 The for-phrase in Modern Greek

Many linguists have reacted against the spuriousness of the for-to complementation and have suggested that there has never been a for-to complementizer at all. Whether this is right or wrong is a matter that does not concern

our analysis here, as we are dealing with a language that has no infinitive constructions.² However, a for-phrase does appear in Modern Greek where the matrix verb is an impersonal expression. Kimball (1971) has discussed the frequent ambiguity of for-phrases as between „datives on adjectives” and as part of an embedded complement. Consider the following sentence:

- (4a) It is good for the economy for everyone to have a job.

In the Greek gloss of this sentence, the 'for' of the Dative on adjective must stay where it is, but the 'for' of the embedded complement is unnecessary, as instead of a 'for to' clause we have a subordinate "tensed" clause.

- (4) *ine kalo ja tin iekonomia na exi o kanenas mja dulja.*

It-is good for the economy MM has article everybody a job
In English there is an ambiguity in the sentence:

- (5) a It is good for John to stay here.

as to whether it is good for John only:

- (5) b It is good for John (to stay here)

or to whether it is good in some absolute, generic sense:

- (5) c It is good [for John to stay here]

In Modern Greek, on the other hand, only the first reading is possible:

- (5) d *ine kalo ja to jani na mini eδo.*

It-is good for Article John MM stay Aor. Subj. here.
The generic sense requires a construction made up of copula + Adjective with a *na* complement in which *Janis* is the nominative case subject:

- (5) e *ine kalo na mini o janis eδo.*

It is good MM Article John here

1.3 The Gerund and Modern Greek

From the semantic point of view there is a relation between factivity and gerundives in English. It was Jespersen (1924) who first noticed that the infinitive seems to be more appropriate than the gerund to denote the imaginative (unreal). This was taken up by D. Bolinger (1967) who observed

² In fact, as has been pointed out by Chomsky, the 'for' 'to' constructions derive from Subjunctives, i.e. a) from b):

- i it is essential for him to do that
ii it is essential that he do that

that there is a properly semantic contrast between nominalizations carried by -ing and those carried by the infinitive. This contrast is, according to him, one between two aspects: reification vs hypothesis or potentiality. At about the same time the Kiparskys wrote what has now become one of the classics in the literature of linguistics: their article entitled 'Fact'. There they proposed that infinitival nominalizations derive from the sentential objects of non-factive predicates, and that gerundive nominalizations derive from the sentential objects of factive predicates: in other words, that the surface contrast between infinitivals and gerundives can be explained in terms of factivity.

In Modern Greek the 'Subjunctive' Mood seems to have taken over all the functions of the English and classical Greek infinitival construction. Like the infinitive, it can denote the unreal or the hypothetical. Like the infinitive in English, the Modern Greek Subjunctive does not normally express a true proposition. Compare:

- (6) *lizmonisa na ton sinandiso* (Aorist-Subj)
I forgot MM him I meet

with:

I forgot to meet him

- (7) *lizmonisa pos (oti) ton sinandisa* (Aorist-Ind)
I forgot that him I met
I forgot that I had met him. I forgot meeting him.

Only the second sentence allows the noun *to yeyonos* the fact, with a sentential complement consisting of the 'oti' clause, to replace the simple *oti*-clause.

- (8a) **lizmonisa to yeyonos na ton sinandiso*
I forgot the fact to meet him

- (8b) *Lizmonisa to yeyonos oti ton sinandisa*
I forgot the fact that I met him.

The lack of gerunds in Modern Greek is compensated for by the use of "articled" sentences: *to oti ine arostos* 'the that he is sick', or by the use of a category of nouns expressing action, activity and (possibly) state, which are normally formed from the stem of the Perfective + an -i(s) noun ending and which correspond to the nouns that have -tion, -al, -ment and -ing endings in English:

Verb	'attempt', 'operate'	Nominal
<i>epixiro</i>	'attempt', 'operate'	<i>epixirisi(s)</i> 'eopration'
(<i>epixiris</i>)-		
<i>lino</i>	'solve', 'loose'	<i>lisi(s)</i> 'solution'
(<i>lis</i> -)		
<i>paralipo</i>	'omit'	<i>paralipsi(s)</i> 'omission'

<i>dieθeeto</i>	'arrange'	<i>θiefθetisi(s)</i> 'arrangement'
(<i>diefθetis</i> -)		
<i>odiyo</i>	'drive', 'lead'	<i>odiθisi(s)</i> 'driving'
(<i>odiyis</i> -)		

Notice that *dhemotiki* has created another class by extending the -si ending into -simo.³ This class comes nearer to the action-activity English gerund. They sometimes differ in meaning from the the -si(s) noun. Thus from the verb *strono*, 'lay', we derive *strois*, 'layer' and *strosimo*, 'the laying (of bed or table)'.

From *lino*, 'solve', 'loose', we get *lisis*, 'solution' and *lisimo*, solution/but also 'loosening', 'undoing'.

Finally, there is a class of -ma ending nouns that can do the work that the gerund does in English; the -ma ending is added to the Perfective stem (the *s* is sometimes deleted).

Imperfective	Perfective stem	Nominal
<i>perpato</i> 'walk'	— <i>perpatis</i> -	→ <i>perpatima</i> , 'walking'
<i>kapnizo</i> , 'smoke'	— <i>kapnis</i> -	→ <i>kapnisma</i> , 'smoking'
<i>Kalo</i> , 'call'	— <i>kales</i> -	→ <i>kalesma</i> , 'calling', 'call'
<i>kerno</i> , 'treat'	— <i>keras</i> -	→ <i>kerasma</i> , 'treating'
<i>sfragizo</i> , 'fill'	— <i>sfragis</i> -	→ <i>sfragisma</i> , 'filling'
	(a tooth)	
<i>yemizo</i> , 'fill'	— <i>yemis</i> -	→ <i>yemisma</i> , 'filling'
<i>perno</i> , 'pass'	— <i>peras</i> -	→ <i>perasma</i> , 'passing'
<i>δjavazo</i> , 'read'	— <i>δjavas</i> -	→ <i>δjavasma</i> , 'reading'
<i>imerono</i> , 'tame'	— <i>imeros</i> -	→ <i>imeroma</i> , 'taming'

Let us now see how those potential gerundives can cope with some constructions analogous to the English -ing forms:

Generic 'activity' constructions

- (9) *to perpatima ine mia kali askisis*
Ø Walking is a good exercise

- (10) *to imeroma lendarjon (Gen) ine epikinδino*
Ø Taming lions is dangerous

There are two things in which the two (Greek and English) constructions

³ Some of these nominals derive straight from the Perfective without any intermediate -si(s) type:

<i>pefto</i>	'fall' (v)	Nominal -si(s)	Nominal -simo
(<i>pes</i>		* <i>pesis</i>	<i>pesimo</i> 'fall' (n)
<i>sfazo</i>	'slay'	* <i>sfaksis</i>	<i>sfaksimo</i> 'slaying'
(<i>sfaks</i>)			

differ: the Greek generic sentence needs a definite article (obligatorily) and also, as far as the second example is concerned, in Modern Greek we have an objective genitive, whereas in English a generic activity gerund takes an object in the Accusative. Both the Greek and the English can be paraphrased: the Greek into subjunctives; the English into for-to emotive infinitival constructions with deleted indefinite subjects. (Stockwell et al. 1972):

(11) *ine mja kali askisis na perpatai kanis*
It is a good exercise MM Subj. walk Indef. pronoun
It's a good exercise (for one) to walk.

(12) *ine epikinðino na imeroni kanis leondarja*
It is dangerous MM Subj. tame Indef. pronoun lions
It's dangerous (for one) to tame lions.

The Greek indefinite pronoun *kanis* is not deletable; there is, however, the alternative of using a generic 2nd pers. sing. which is copied onto the verb ending.

(13) *ine mja kali askisis na perpatas*
It is a good exercise MM Subj. you walk

(14) *ine epikinðino na imeronis leondarja*
It is dangerous MM Subj. you tame lions

More problematic is the rendering of Poss-ing into Modern Greek. In fact, there are two ways to render it: either a nominal (-*si*, -*isimo*, -*ma* ending) or, with a complement modified by the neuter gender definite article to:

(15)a *to ðiavasma tu jani*
the reading of John

(15)b *to oti o janis ðiavazi*
The that John reads

If the verb is transitive, the construction will be: Nominal+Objective Genitive+PP (Agent)

to ðivaasma tu vivliu apo ton jani
the reading of the book from John

1.4. On the Syntax of Complement Constructions

There are many reasons which can lead us to adopt an NP analysis for Modern Greek Complements:

(a) They can enter into most of the functional relations of ordinary NPs like their English counterparts:

Subject:(to) *na kanis peripato to vraði ine efxaristo*
Article MM do walk the evening is pleasant
Going for a walk in the evening is pleasant

Object: *nomizo pos exi erði*
I think that he has come

Obj. Prep: *vasizete sto oti ða ton voiðiso*
He relies on Article that I will help him

Subj. Compl: *to xombi tu ine na mazevi petaluðes*
the hobby of him is subj. M. collect butterflies
His hobby is collecting butterflies

Apposition: *moni tu apasoxolisi, to na mazevi ta enikia apo tis polikatikies pu exi, tu troi olo tu ton kero.*
His only occupation, collecting the rents from the blocks of flats that he owns, takes up all of his time.

(b) They pronominalize and cliticize like NPs
to pistevo apolita oti o petros ine timios.
It I believe absolutely that Peter is honest.
I absolutely believe that Peter is honest.

(c) Interestingly, most complement clauses can take a *Definite Article*, which, in cases of verbs followed by prepositions, is obligatory. Classical Greek made an extensive use of Articled Infinitives, some of which were taken over by "kaðarevusa", the puristic Modern Greek language. Officialese has still a good stock of them, especially used as complements of the verb *apayorevete*, 'it is forbidden'.

(16)a *apayorevete to fonaskin endos tis eðusis*
It is forbidden Art. to speak loudly in the room
Speaking loudly in the room is forbidden

(16)b *apayorevete to sinerxesðe paranomos*
It is forbidden Art to assemble illegally
(to asseble) Assembling illegally is forbidden

In colloquial Greek there are no longer any Articled infinitives. Instead, you can have either a *si(s)*, *isimo* or *ma* nominal (see pages 102 - 103) or a *na* + subjunctive construction with the optional use of the Definite Article. Note that the complementizers *pu* (that) and *pos* (that) cannot take an article, though *oti* and *na* can:

(17)a (to) *oti ine vlakas, oli to kserume*
Art. that he is fool all it we know
We all know that he is a fool

- (18)b? to pos ine vlakas oli to kserume⁴
 to na exis aftokinito exi meyalis simasia simera
 Art. MM Subj. have can has great importance nowadays
 It is very important to have a car nowadays

The fact that *to* is a singular neuter article may suggest that it is the remnant of the phrase *to yeyonos* 'the fact', after a *yeyonos* deletion has taken place; however, *to* is used with *na* complementizers as well, as witnessed from the last example, which are, as a rule non-factive complementizers.

Note that the use of the article *to* becomes obligatory if the complement clause starts with a preposition:

- (19) ipoloyizi Prep. Art. oti 9a exi tin plire ipostiriksi mas
 He counts on the that will have the full support of us
 He counts on the fact that he will have our full support

- (20) *ipoloyizi se oti 9a exi tin pliri ipostiriksi mas

Interestingly, the use of the Article can be extended to cover Wh-complements:

- (21)a (to) ti 9a kano, 9en afora esena
 the what I will do, not concerns you
 What I'll do does not concern you
- (21)b (to) pjos espase to vaz0, kanis zen to kseri
 Art. who broke the vase
 nobody not it he knows
 Nobody knows who broke the vase
- (21)c (to) pu pa pame, ine alo pema
 Art. where we shall go is another
 topic Where we shall go is another matter
- (21)d (to) an pa erpi, eksartate apo ton kero
 Art. if he will come depends
 from the weather
 Whether he will come (or not), depends on the weather
- (21)e (to) pote pa pandrefto, ine a nosto ke se mena ton izjo
 Art. when I will get married is unknown and to me the same
 When I will get married I don't even know myself.

⁴ As far as *pos* is concerned it may be a matter of dialect but *pu* never does take an article:

- i lipame pu ine toso vlakas
 I regret that he is so stupid
 ii *to pu ine vlakas, lipame

Note that in all the above sentences the complement has been topicalized. The Article can also be used with untopicalized complement, though less frequently.

- (22) kanis zen kseri (to) pjos espase to vaz0
 cliticization of the complement clause:

Also, topicalization triggers

- (23)a oli (to) kserume (to) oti ine vlakas
 All it we know Art. that he is stupid.

Here both the clitic and the article are optional. But if the complement clause is preposed, the sentence becomes ungrammatical without the clitic, though the use of the Article still remains optional:

- (23)b (to) oti ine vlakas, oli to kserume
 (23)c *(to) oti ine vlakas, oli kserume
 (23)d (to) na pelis mja plusia nifi, to katalaveno
 Art. MM Subj. you want
 a rich bride it I understand
 I understand you wish to get yourself
 a rich bride
 (23)e *(to) na pelis mja plusia nifi, katalaveno

Finally, in connection with the two other test proofs, namely, passivization and pseudo-cleft, I have to say the following: the Passive Voice is very idiosyncratic in Modern Greek and much less used, even in written Greek, than in English. There is a considerable number of verbs which though transitive do not normally passivize.

On the other hand, pseudo-cleft sentences can obtain. But though there exists a free relative corresponding to the English 'what', Mod Greek uses a periphrasis made up of a demonstrative *ekinos* 'that' or *aftos* 'this', plus a relative in pseudoclefts:

- ekino pu 9en kseri kanis ine (to) pjos espase to vaz0 -
 that which not he knows nobody is Art. who broke the vase
 What nobody knows is who broke the vase.

Thus, the syntactic analysis of complement clauses, which applies both to English and to Mod Greek should be modified into

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{NP} \\ | \\ \text{S} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{NP} \\ / \quad \backslash \\ \text{D} \quad \text{S} \end{array}$$

to account for the complements which take the neuter gender definite article *to* (cf. the English: 'killing rabbits' which derives diachronically from 'the killing rabbits').

2. On the Semantics of Complement Clauses

0. Introduction

In a previous article (Kakouriotis 1977) I had dealt with some Mod Greek predicates and had observed that when they are heavily stressed, they can change from Nonfactive into Factive predicates. In the present article I have tried to divide Mod Greek into various semantic classes, following Hooper (1975).

There are not any striking differences between English and Mod Greek as far as the semantics of complement clauses is concerned. However, predicates like *fenete* 'it seems' present problems for an analysis which divides predicates into Factives and Nonfactives since its meaning changes from 'it seems' (Nonfactive) to 'it is clear', 'it is self-evident' (Factive).⁵

As far as the syntax of the predicate clauses is concerned, we notice that whereas all the glosses of the Mod Greek predicates take a full that-clause, which is the equivalent of the Mod Greek *oti*-clause, in Greek the group of Nonassertive Nonfactives (see next page) do not take an *oti*- (Indicative) clause but a *na* - (Subjunctive) clause.

TABLE I
SEMANTIC CLASSES OF PREDICATES

NONFACTIVE

Assertive

Weak Assertives		Strong Assertives			
		(a)		(b)	
<i>Saro</i>	'guess'	<i>anaynorizo</i>	'acknowledge'	<i>ime veveos</i>	'be certain'
<i>nomizo</i>	'think'	<i>anafero</i>	'mention'	<i>ime siyuros</i>	'be positive'
<i>fandazome</i>	'imagine'	<i>diatinome</i>	'maintain'	<i>ine fanero</i>	'be obvious'
<i>fenome</i>	'seem'	<i>dilono</i>	'state'	<i>ipoloyizo</i>	'calculate'
<i>ipodeto</i>	'suppose'	<i>epimeno</i>	'insist'	<i>ipoptevome</i>	'suspect'
<i>pistevo</i>	'believe'	<i>epiveveono</i>	'assure'	<i>fovame</i>	'be afraid'
		<i>eksiyo</i>	'explain'	<i>simfono</i>	'agree'

⁵ Thus in i and ii below the predicate *fenete* is either Factive (i) or Nonfactive (ii) depending on whether it is heavily stressed or not.:

- i *fenete oti ine kurasmenos*
It is self-evident that he is tired
ii *fenete oti ine kurasmenos*
It seems that he is tired

Not surprisingly, i can alternatively take the factive complementizer *pu* whereas ii can't, as witness:

- i' *fenete pu ine kurasmenos*
ii' **fenete pu ine kurasmenos*

<i>isxirizome</i>	'claim'	<i>simbereno</i>	'conclude'
	'maintain'		
<i>leo</i>	'say, tell'		
<i>paradexome</i>	'admit',		
	'acknowledge'		
<i>paratiro</i>	'remark'		
<i>proleyo</i>	'predict'		
<i>tonizo</i>	'emphasize'		
<i>de leo*</i>	'I don't',		
	'deny'		
<i>elpizo</i>	'hope'		
<i>ipodeto</i>	'hypothesize'		

Nonassertives

<i>endexete</i>	'be possible'
<i>ine pidano</i>	'be probable'
<i>ine dianoito</i>	'be conceivable'
<i>ine dinato</i>	'be possible'

Table I cont.

Negative Nonassertives

<i>ine adianoito</i>	'be inconceivable'
<i>ine adinato</i>	'be impossible'
<i>ine apidano</i>	'be improbable'
<i>amfivalo?</i>	'doubt'
<i>arnume*</i>	'deny'

TABLE II
SEMANTIC CLASSES OF PREDICATES
FACTIVE

Assertive (Semifactives)		Nonassertives (true factives)	
<i>anakalipto</i>	'discover'	<i>arki</i>	'it suffices'
<i>apokalipto</i>	'reveal'	<i>exi simasia</i>	'be significant'

* The negative of *leo* 'say', *de leo* when used parenthetically, it does not mean 'I don't say' but 'I do not deny'. Compare:

- i *de leo oti ise kalos*
I don't say that you are good
ii *de leo, ise kalos*
I don't deny, you are good
you are good, I don't deny it

⁷ *amfivalo* belongs semantically to his list but it presents the problem that instead of *na* complementizer it normally takes the conjunction *an* 'if' though sentences with *na* can also be heard i.e.

amfivalo na exi erdi akoma
'I doubt it that he has come yet'

⁸ *arnume* 'deny' behaves semantically like an assertive verb though semantically is clearly Nonassertive. Note that both *amfivalo* and *arnume* are strong assertives when negated in which case they both take complementizer *oti*.

<i>diapistono</i>	'realize'	<i>ine perieryo</i>	'be odd'
<i>ynorizo</i>	'know'	<i>ksexnao</i>	'forget'
<i>exo ipopsi mu</i>	'know'	<i>lipame</i>	'be sorry'
<i>Simame</i>	'remember'	<i>metrai</i>	'it counts'
<i>katalavono</i>	'realize'	<i>paraksenevome</i>	'be surprised'
<i>ksero</i>	'know'	<i>pezi rolo</i>	'be significant',
<i>maθeno</i>	'learn'		'it counts'
<i>paratiro</i>	'notice'	<i>stenoxorjeme</i>	'be sorry',
	'observe'		'bother'
<i>pliroforume</i>	'find out'	<i>pirazi</i>	'it matters'
	'be informed'		
<i>vlepo</i>	'see', 'notice'		

2. Semantic Classification of Predicates

2.1 Assertives vs. Nonassertives

The semantic distinction of predicates into factives and non-factives is a very useful one but it cannot account for all the facts that concern complement clauses in Mod. Greek.

We have already seen problems presented by verbs like *fenete*, in connection with the presupposition of their complements; for this reason I have adopted another way of classifying the complement clauses, based on an analysis by Joan Hooper (1975).

This is a classification of verbs based on the ability or inability of the predicate to undergo certain syntactic operations. But it is defensible on semantic grounds and has associated with it a semantic explanation for the syntactic differences among the classes of predicates listed above.

The general conclusion that we shall draw from this section is that syntactic phenomena have semantic explanations, as Hooper has observed. But we shall also notice on the other hand, that semantic phenomena may have pragmatic explanations. This supports my own general thesis that there is an interdependence between syntax, semantics and pragmatics in terms of which one can explain what we call language function.

The predicates above have been divided into four main classes whose complements consist of the complementizer *oti* or *na* plus a full S. All classes belonging to the Assertives basically take the complementizer *oti* unless there are good "semantic" reasons for their not doing so. Non-factives are the only class which takes only *na* complementizers with the exception of *arnume* which in Mod. Greek means, (a) 'refuse' in which case they must take a *na* complement, (b) 'deny' in which case they must take an *oti* complement. Finally, Non-assertives basically take the complementizer *pu*⁹ unless again there are semantic reasons which force them to take *na*. Another exception

⁹ Sometimes *pu* is replaced by *oti* in this class but in such case it is always preceded by the definite article *to*.

here is *ksexno* 'forget' which can have any of the three (*oti*, *na*, *pu*) complementizers.

The assertive predicates form a natural semantic class and share a common feature; they are affirmative in nature: the speaker or subject of the sentence has an affirmative opinion regarding the truth value of the complement proposition. The strong assertives (list a) describe a verbal act with regard to the complement proposition and this act is affirmatory, as opposed to the Non-assertives.

The strong assertives of list b and the weak assertives describe a mental act, process or attitude regarding the truth of the complement proposition. The opinion that the speaker or subject expresses with the second class of strong assertives and the weak assertives is also positive: a negative opinion renders the predicate Non-assertive.

The Non-negative Non-assertive (*ine piθano*, *ine endexomeno*) express such weak affirmation regarding the truth value of the complement proposition that they fall short of being assertive (Hooper 1975: 95).

The most important characteristic of the Assertive predicates is that they allow complement preposing unlike the Non-assertives which do not. This means that Assertive predicates can be used parenthetically and occupy either rear or middle or front position in the sentence separated from their complement by comma(s).

- (1)a *Simame*, i meri itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio
I remember, Mary was the prettiest girl in school
b i meri, *Simame*, itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio
c i meri itan, *Simame*, i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio
d i meri itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio, *Simame*
- (2)a' **ksexno*, i meri itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio
I forget Mary was the prettiest girl in school
b' *i meri, *ksexno*, itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio
c' *i meri itan, *ksexno*, i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio
d' *i meri itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio, *ksexno*
- (3)a *nomizo*, o janis θa erθi mazi mas
I think John will come with us
b o janis, *nomizo*, θa erθi mazi mas
c o janis θa erθi, *nomizo*, mazi mas
d o janis θa erθi mazi mas, *nomizo*
- (4)a' **arnume* o janis irθe mazi mas (cf. *arnume oti* o janis irθe mazi mas)
I deny John came with us
b' *o janis, *arnume*, irθe mazi mas
c' *o janis irθe, *arnume*, mazi mas
d' *o janis irθe mazi mas, *arnume*

The difference between parenthetical and non-parenthetical main clauses are both syntactic and semantic. In the first place, parenthetical predicates are normally not followed by complementizers. Both *Simame* and *nomizo* in their non-parenthetical reading require the complementizer *oti*:

- (5)a'' *Simame oti i meri itan i omorfoteri sto skolio*
I remember that Mary was the prettiest in school
a''' *nomizo oti o janis 9a er9i mari mas*
I think that John will come with us.

The semantic difference between parenthetical and non-parenthetical clauses is that in the former the complement clause constitutes the main assertion whereas the main clause is *semantically subordinated* that is, in the case of parenthesis, the embedded subordinate clause is given more importance while the parenthetical clause undergoes a kind of semantic reduction.

The assertive quality of the complement proposition can be proved by the fact that complement preposing is forbidden when the main predicate is negated. Compare (6a) which is complement preposed with (6b) which is not:

- (6)a **i meri itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio, den isxirizete*
Mary was the prettiest girl in school, she doesn't claim
(cf. *i meri itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio, isxirizete*)
b *i meri den isxirizete oti itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio*
Mary doesn't claim that she was the prettiest girl in school

In the case of parenthetical predicate the scope of negation is limited to the assertive proposition that is, we can negate the preposed complement clause but we cannot negate the main clause which has been semantically reduced.

Let us now consider the non-parenthetical (6)b. There, the negative element can negate words that belong either to the main or the complement proposition (the negated element in each sentence is underlined).

- (7)a *i méri den isxirizete oti itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio, i eléni to isxirizete afto.*
Máry doesn't claim that she was the prettiest girl in class, *Hélen* does (claims that)
b *i meri den isxirizete oti itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio; apenandias, to arníte.*
Mary doesn't *claim* that she was the prettiest girl in class; on the contrary, she *denies* that.
c *i meri den isxirizete oti itan i omorfóteri kopela sto skolio apenandias isxirizete oti ine tóra*
on the contrary she claims that she is *now*.

- d *i meri den isxirizete oti itan i omorfóteri kopela sto skolio ala oti itan i eksipnóteri*
but that she was the *cleverest*
e *i meri den isxirizete oti itan i omorfoteri kopela sto skolio ala se oli tin perioxi tis notioanatolikis evropis.*
but in the whole area of south-eastern Europe.

(7)a and b negate elements belonging to the main proposition; the rest negate elements of the complement proposition.

This shows then, that in non-parenthetical assertives both main and complement propositions are assertions since both are affected by negation.

The other diagnostic test (question) can again, show that both main and complement proposition elements can be affected. Thus, in an interrogative sentence like (8) below any of the underlined elements is capable of being questioned provided, of course, that the main clause is not parenthetical.

- (8) *aftos ipe oti 9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo?*
Did he say that we were going to the cinema?

On the contrary, a parenthetical reading with the complement clause preposed, does not affect the main clause assertion at all;

- (9) *9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo, ipe aftos?*
in (9) only the elements of the preposed complement are affected by question. Heavy stress can fall on any of the underlined elements in (8); but in (9), neither of the parenthetical elements (*ipe, aftos*) can be stressed.

On the other hand, answers can be obtained out of *any* underlined element in (8); in (9) you cannot have answers through questioning the parenthetical clause elements. Compare answers given to (8) with those given to (9):

- (8)a *aftós ipe oti 9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo?*
Did *he* say we were going to the cinema?

Answer: ne, *aftós* (yes, *hé*)

- (9)a **9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo, ipe aftós?*

Answer: ne, *aftós*

- (8)b *aftos ipe oti 9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo?*

Answer: ne, *ipe* (yes, he *said*)

- (9)b **9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo, ipe aftos?*

Answer: *ne, *ipe*

Sentences like: *i meri isxirizeto oti ine i omorfoteri kopela* and *aftos ipe oti 9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo* contain two claims to truth listed as follows:

i *aftos ipe X*;

ii *9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo.*

Syntactically *i* is the main proposition; semantically however either *i* or *ii* can be the main proposition depending on whether the sentence is used parenthetically or not.

But clearly this is a case where pragmatics comes in. Contextual considerations determine whether the main or the subordinate clause constitutes the main proposition. Consider the sentences below:

Speaker A: *pjos ipe oti 9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo?*
Who said that we are going to the cinema?

Speaker B (1) **9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo, ipe aftos*
We shall go to the cinema, *he* said.
(2) *aftos ipe oti 9a pame ston kinimatoyrafo.*
He said that we shall go to the cinema.

An answer like (1) constitutes what we usually call error in language performance. But it certainly has to do with pragmatics and what we describe as the *thematic structure* of the sentence.

What determines here which is the main proposition (semantically) is the *focus* of the sentence. It is *always* the case that parenthetical clauses, that is, clauses which though syntactically main clauses are semantically subordinated because it contains an element (*aftos*) about which Speaker A requires information. It is by no means insignificant that both assertion and focus are affected by negation and questioning; this is so because the later is normally contained in the former: whatever is deliberately prominent by the speaker, by heavy stress, is bound to be interpreted as of especial significance by its hearer and hence the focus of information.

In fact, when we said that either the main or the subordinate clause can be semantically more important than the other in the case of non-parenthetical clauses, we meant that in that case the focus can be contained in either clause thereby strengthening it as assertion and rendering it semantically the main proposition regardless of whether it was syntactically the main clause or not.

Before I go on, I will cite two cases of assertive predicates which, in their parenthetical status, have been reduced almost to meaninglessness.

The Mod Greek verb *9aro* 'guess' seems to be so weakly asserted that it can never be negated itself; sentence (10)b is considered by most speakers of Mod Greek to be unacceptable:

- (10)a *9aro (oti) 9a vreaksi.*
I guess that it will rain.
b **8en 9aro oti 9a vreaksi.*
not I guess that it will rain.

It seems that the verb has undergone a diachronic reduction and now it is used only as a parenthetical predicate; thus, it is because (10) is weakly asserted, that it cannot be negated.

The second case of semantic reduction, very characteristic in both Mod Greek and English, are the second person Sg. of *kseris* 'you know' and *vlepis* 'you see'. Compare (11) with (12) and (13) with (14):

- (11) *vlepis oti ime arostos.*
you see that I am sick.
(12) *ime arostos, vlepis.*
I am sick, you see.
(13) *kseris oti ime arostos.*
you know that I am sick.
(14) *ime arostos, kseris.*
I am sick, you know.

We can say that those predicates in their parenthetical use, have undergone such semantic reduction that they have come to be meaningless. Speakers constantly use them without ever referring to their addressees knowledge, sight, awareness or anything.

We can now use this semantic reduction idea of parenthetical assertions to account for the so-called *Extrapolation from Object*. The case is, then, that assertive verbs used parenthetically do not undergo this kind of extrapolation as witness:

- (15)a *to pistevo oti ise of yois tis sinikias.*
I believe it that you are the lady-killer of the neighbourhood.
b *(*to) pistevo, ise o yois tis sinikias.*
c *ise, (*to) pistevo, a yois tis sinikias.*
d *ise o yois tis sinikias, (*to) pistevo.*

Sentences (15)b, c and d are grammatical without the clitic object *to* and ungrammatical with it. In all three cases of them the main proposition is used parenthetically.

Furthermore what we have classified as weak assertives resist Extrapolation from Object even on their non-parenthetical readings.

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| <i>to pistevo</i> | (it I believe) | |
| ? <i>to ipo9eto</i> ¹⁰ | (it I suppose) | <i>oti 9a er9i avrio</i> |
| * <i>to nomizo</i> | (it I think) | that he will come tomorrow |
| * <i>to 9aro</i> | (it I guess) | |

The claim I am making then, is that so long as the main proposition is weakly asserted or parenthetical, Extrapolation¹¹ from object cannot obtain. But it does occur if the main clause is also the *main assertion* and the comple-

¹⁰ In some contexts extrapolation from object with *ipo9eto* is possible due to the fact that apart from 'suppose', it also has the meaning of 'hypothesize' in which case it should be classified as a strong Assertive (see table on pages 108, 109)

¹¹ Extrapolation in Mod Greek is not a syntactic phenomenon as it is in English that is, there is no "it-Extrapolation" in this language. What actually occurs is a reversion of the order Subject Predicate which can be accounted for in terms of the thematic structure of the sentence.

ment clause is semantically subordinated. This means that whenever Extra-position from object takes place the complement clause normally constitutes old or background information but it does not necessarily mean that the complement proposition is also *presupposed*. Compare the following sentences

- (16)a to kseris oti exo tria pedja.
 it you know that I have three children.
 you know it that I have three children.
 b den to kseris oti exo tria pedja.
 you don't know it that I have three children.
- (17)a to paraðexese oti ise diyamos.
 it you admit that you are a bigamist.
 you admit it that you are a bigamist.
 b den to paraðexese oti ise diyamos.
 you don't admit that you are a bigamist.

In both (16) and (17), the complement proposition is semantically less important than the main proposition, yet, in (16)a and b it is presupposed since it remains constant under negation, whereas in (17)a and b it is not presupposed.

In the subsections that follow, we shall be dealing with all the semantic classes of predicates listed on table I (page 108) and on table II page 109) starting with the Weak Assertives.

Weak Assertives

The common feature of the weak assertives is that their complements are "weakly" asserted, i.e. the speaker is reserved and does not express a strong opinion about the truth of the complement clause. But notice that it is some of these verbs that with the assistance of a heavy stress can acquire all the characteristics of factive predicates, as I have already shown in Kakouriotis 1977.

- (18)a *fénete* oti ine sarandaris
 It is self-evident (lit. it seems) that he is forty
 b (to) *ipeðesa*
 I supposed
 oti ða erxotane/ða erði
 c (to) *fantástika*
 that he would come/will come
 I imagined
 d (to) *perimena*
 I expected

Joan Hooper has noticed that "the predicates classed by their semantic content, instead of falling neatly into classes, they form a continuum so that there may not be clear breaks between one class and the next" ((1975: 93). The data from Mod Greek shows that this continuum is somehow circular since the weak assertives under heavy stress are "factivized" and thus we have predicates of the first class of list I, sharing a common feature with predicates of the last class in list II: they can both have complements which are *true propositions* and which are *not* affected by negation.

With the exception of *fenete*, however, all other weak assertives have to be in a past tense in order to have their complements presupposed. Consider a somehow similar case with the English verb 'think':

- (19)a I thought it was you.
 b I *thought* it was you.

Again stress and the past tense have factivized a weak assertive: in (19)a the complement proposition is counterfactual; in (19)b it is factual; in a the weak assertive means 'I was under the erroneous impression'; in b the same predicate means something like 'I knew (it)'.

In the case of *fenete* 'seem', heavy stress alone seems to be able to factivize the predicate but in all other cases, it combines with a past tense without the help of which the complement of those predicates can never be true propositions:

- (20)a to ipoðeto
 Present
 b to fandazome oti ða erði/oti erxete
 Present that he will come/that he comes
 c to perimeno
 Present

As long as what is expressed by the complement proposition has not actually occurred, we can only make hypotheses about it. But when the complement proposition represents something that has occurred, the weak assertives cease to express hypotheses since by now it can be proved that their complement propositions are true propositions. In fact these predicates *seem* to have ceased to be assertives at all since (a): negation does not affect their complements as we have seen, (b): they can no longer be used parenthetically. In fact in both the Greek, and the English example (19)b, there is a commitment to the truth of the complement clause.

The predicates listed as "weak assertives" may have Subjunctival complements instead of Indicative ones. When *na* is used instead of *oti*, the degree of likelihood assigned to their complement proposition is further weakened and

they now express a much weaker opinion about the truth of the complement to the extent that this complement proposition is no longer an assertion. It is not surprising then, that in this case their syntax is the same as that of the Nonassertive predicates, that is, they, too, take *na* complements. Like them, they express such weak affirmation regarding the truth value of the complement proposition that they now fall short of being assertive. Compare the sentences:

- (21)a *pistevo na nikisume*
I believe MM win
I believe that we will win
b *pistevo oti 9a nikisume.*

There are two meanings of believe¹², one pertaining to conviction and the other to opinion; sentence (21)b may have either of these meanings. In (21)a, however, the speaker expresses a stronger degree of uncertainty about the truth of the complement proposition than in (21)b. An adverb like 'firmly' or 'absolutely' which expresses a strong opinion or conviction can fit in (21)b but never in (21)a as witness:

- (22)a **pistevo akra9anda na nikisume*
firmly
b *pistevo akra9anda oti 9anda na axikisume*

pistevo, *fandazome* and *ipo9eto* when followed by a *na* complement express wish, possibility or probability. On the other hand, *nomizo*, when it takes a *na* complement it is always negative.

- (23)a **nomizo na ir9e*
I think MM he came
b *9en nomizo na ir9e*
not think MM he came

Notice that the negation is always in the higher verb:

- c **nomizo na min ir9e.*
I think MM not came.

This fact poses problems for the rule of negative transportation since 'nomizo' is one of the verbs that they do allow negative raising that is, (23d) and e are synonymous on at least one reading:

- (23)d *nomizo oti 9en ir9e.*
I think that he didn't come

¹² It seems that there exist two 'believes' one pertaining to conviction, the other to opinion. If followed by Indicative the Mod. Greek *pistevo* can have either meaning. But if it takes a *na* Subjunctive complement it may not refer to the speaker's convictions.

- e *9en nomizo oti ir9e*
I don't think he came

It might be the case that 'na' complements disallow negative raising but *fenete* shows that they do not:

- (24)a *fenete na min kseri tipote.*
He seems not to know anything.
b *9den fenete na kseri tipote.*
He doesn't seem to know anything.

Sentences (23)b cannot be justified as derived from (23)c through negative raising since the latter is ungrammatical. The case is then, that *nomizo* does not take a *na* complement unless it is negated itself and not the lower verb only, since both, *nomizo na ir9e* and *nomizo na min ir9e* are ungrammatical.

It seems then, that, with the exclusion of *nomizo* the weak assertives when followed by a *na* subjunctival complement turn into volitional or wish predicates. Note the peculiarity of (25)b below:

- (25)a *pistevo*
oti mja mera 9a katalikso sti filaki
fandazome
that one day I will end up in prison
ipo9eto
b? *pistevo*
? *fandazome na katalikso sti filaki mja mera*
* *ipo9eto*

Sentence (25)a is O.K. because the Subject-speaker weakly asserts his own future in the complement proposition. In (25)b he seems to be wishing his own doom hence the peculiarity of the sentence. People may wish they were dead but they normally do not wish they were in prison.

In the weak assertives there seems to be a semantic difference between the first person singular or present tense and all the other cases. With this person the speaker expresses a tentative opinion about the truth of the complement; but notice the difference in meaning that a difference in persons sometime involves.

- (26)a *nomizo, ime eksipnos*
I think, I'm clever
b? *nomizi, ine eksipnos*
He thinks, he's clever

Sentence (26a) is an opinion about one's own self; (26)b, on the other hand, is an assertion referring to the Subject but expressed by a speaker; *nomizi* in (26)b usually means 'he erroneously believes that he is clever', a meaning

normally not applicable when the subject of the sentence happens to be the speaker himself (cf. 26a).

It seems then that when the weak assertives are used in other than the first person, as (26)b, they do not undergo the semantic reduction characteristic to those verb and thus a parenthetical reading is difficult to obtain:

	? nomizi
	He thinks
(27) ine eksipnos,	? 9ari
He is clever,	He guesses
	*ipogeti
	He supposes
	*pistevi
	He believes

But notice that in a tense other than the Present, a weak assertive requires its *full* semantic content regardless of person, in other words, whereas the two assertive *nomizo* (26)a and (26)b are not synonymous, at least on one reading (28)a and (28)b are, as witness:

- (28)a I thought I was clever
b He thought he was clever

Both (28)a and (28)b may mean 'wrongly believe' or 'be under the erroneous impression': the speaker can admit past mistakes.

The parenthetical, semantically reduced reading of the weak assertives then, is more or less confined to the Present tense first person singular:

	pistepsa ¹³
	I believed
(29) ??imuna eksipnos,	ipe8esa
I was clever	I supposed
	nomisa
	I thought

Strong Assertives

Contra the Kiparsky's, for some non-factive predicates extraposition is not obligatory:

- (30)a (to) oti 9a nikisume ine veveo
(The) that we will win is certain

¹³ All these predicates, when parenthetically used, become synonymous to *9aro*, the weakest assertive. But it is hard to obtain such a reading in the Aorist (Perfective). Note that *9aro* has no Perfective tenses: **9arisa*, **9ariso*, **exo 9arisi*. Nor can its English counterpart 'guess' be used in a Perfect Tense with a parenthetical meaning, i.e. he is right, I gues vs. *he is right, I have guessed.

- b ine veveo oti 9a nikisume
It is certain that we will win

With other non-factives, however, it is obligatory:

- (31)a *to oti 9a nikisume, pistevete
The that we will win, it is believed
b pistevete oti 9a nikisume
It is believed that we will win

This can be explained in terms of strong and weak assertion. Sentences (30) has a strong assertive predicate, sentences (31) a weak one.

I have explained extraposition in terms of focus and thematic structure in Kakouriotis (1979) where I have claimed that the focus of information is always contained in the main assertion of a sentence. The difference between strong and weak assertive predicates is that whereas in the former either the main or the subordinate clause can become the main proposition (and also the focus), in the latter, owing to their reduced semantic content, they give way to the subordinate clause which becomes the assertion and contains the focus of the sentence. But extraposition puts at the end of the sentence what is new or important information. But clearly the end position is not the right place for the weak assertive which is semantically reduced and cannot receive a heavy stress. Put it in another way, in (30)a, either *nikisume* (subordinate) or *veveo* (main) can act as foci of information; in (31) on the other hand, only *nikisume* can become the focus because the main clause verb *pistevete* 'it is believed' is a weak assertive.

Yet, the end position is not always retained for the focus of information; sometimes the focus is positioned just before the end of the sentence comes; what follows, however, is separated from focus by comma intonation; sentence (31)a can, then, appear with the same order of the elements provided that the last element *pistevete* is not the main assertion and it is not the focus of the sentence, that is, provided that the main predicate 'pistevete' is parenthetical:¹⁴

- (32) 9a nikisume, pistevete
We will, in is believed.

Whereas all the predicates listed as weak assertives can also have subjunctival complements, only very few of the strong assertives can be followed by the subjunctive i.e. *epimeno* 'insist', *ipoloyizo* 'calculate', *simfono* 'agree', are among them.

G. Leech discussed the verbs 'wish', 'want' and 'insist' and postulates an underlying feature "volition" for all three of them (1974: 303). I tend to think that 'insist' has apart from the feature "volition" another feature i.e.

¹⁴ In such a case the complementizer *oti* is normally deleted.

'deontic'. In fact in either of these cases the Mod Greek *epimeno* takes a *na* subjunctival Complement (cf. the English where there is an alternative between Subjunctive and a *should*-construction e.e. 'I insist that he be present' vs. 'I insist he should be present':

volitional: *i 9ia mu epimeni na vlepi tenies porno*
My aunt insists on watching blue movies

deontic: *b i 9ia mu epimeni na meletao perisotero*
My aunt insists that I should study harder

Notice that a "volitional" predicate can, in similar cases, in particular when the verb of the Subjunctive complement is the Present tense, have this complement presupposed. Sentence (33)a presupposes *i 9ia mu vlepi tenies porno* 'my aunt watches blue movies'. On the other hand, when the predicate is a strong assertive and it takes an *oti* Indicative complement, this complement is never presupposed, as for instance in ((33)c.

(33)c *i 9a mu epimeni oti vlepi tenies porno.*
My aunt insists that she watches blue movies.

Nonsassertives

This class of predicates is always followed by Subjunctive,¹⁵ the first type of the lexical item i.e. *api9ano* 'unlikely'. Of the two non-impersonal predicates *amfivalo* 'doubt' and *arnume* 'deny', the former expresses a very weak opinion concerning the truth of the complement proposition; the latter is nonassertive by virtue of its negativeeness.

Notice that a negated *amfivalo* turns into a strong assertive: absence of doubt implies certainty. We have said that complement proposing with subsequent parenthesization of the main clause obtains only in assertive predicates: *amfivalo* and *arnume* and can be parenthetical only when negated:

(34)a	<i>arnume</i>
*ise eksipnos,	I deny
You are clever,	<i>amfivalo</i>
	I doubt

¹⁵ *arnume* is an exception; but this predicate looks like a negated strong assertive i.e. it means 'to say that something is not true'. It thus complies with the syntax of a strong assertive which retains the Indicative when negated (c.f. *leo* 'say'):

9e leo oti ise eksipnos
not I say that you are clever
I do not say that you are clever

b	<i>9en t arnume</i>
ise eksipnos,	I don't deny
You are clever,	<i>9en amfivalo</i>
	I don't doubt

Semifactives

There is a class of predicates which is rather hard to classify. This is so because it stands between factives and nonfactives containing characteristics of both. Karttunen (1971) was the first scholar to draw a line between pure factive and semifactives; the former presuppose their complements under any condition; the latter do not. Consider the following:

(35)a *lipase pu exase i oma9a su?*
Are you sorry that your (favourite) team lost?
b *stenoxorjese pu pandreftike i lusi?*
Do you bother that Lucy got married?

Questioning cannot alter the truth of the complements of (35)a and b *i oma9a su exase* and *i lusi pandreftike* respectively. If you negate the sentences, we will witness the same thing again: the complement clause will remain constant. Notice that stress cannot affect the truth of the complement clause, either. No matter which item of (35)b: *stenoxorjese*, *pandreftike* or *lusi* is stressed the complement clause is still presupposed.

Consider, however, the verb *ksero* 'know' which is supposed to be a factive predicate:

(36)a *(to) iksera oti 9a erxotone*
I knew it that the would come
b *iksera oti 9a erxotane*
(I thought) he would come

Only in case the main predicate (the semifactive) is heavily stressed is the complement clause presupposed. The same applies to the interrogative and the negative of (36). Their complements too, remain constant if and only if the main predicate is heavily stressed. It seems then, that whereas heavy stress tends to factivize weak assertives like, *perimeno*, *fandazome*, *opi9eto*, the absence of a heavy stress, from a factive like *ksero*, has the opposite effect. This predicate has now been defactivized and it behaves like a weak assertive, that is, like *perimena*, *fantastika* and *iper9esa*.

Other semifactives behave in a similar way:

(37)a *to 9m9aa*
I learned *oti pandreftikes*
(factive)

b *eplilrofori9ika* that you got married
I was informed

(38)a *ema9a*
eplirofori9ika *oti pandreftikes* (nonfactive)

A sentence that questions the truth of the complement can be added in (38) but not in (37) as witness:

(37)a' **to ema9a oti pandreftikes, ine ali9ja?*
I learnt it that you got married, is it true?

(38)a' *ema9a oti pandreftikes, ine ali9ja?*

You cannot question what is presupposed (37)a' but you can question what is asserted (38)a'. Like all-assertives, *ema9a* and *pliroforori9ika* can have their complements preposed:

(39) *pandreftikes, ema9a*
plirofori9ika

But complement preposing cannot obtain in (37)a, hence the unacceptability of (37)a'.

(37)a'' **pandreftikes, to ema9a*

The assertive predicate *ema9a* is also the focus and it cannot be reduced to a parenthetical status. This complies with the part of theory which maintains that factive predicates cannot undergo complement preposing. In sentence (37) *ema9a* and *pliroforori9ika* are factives and the proposition *pandreftikes* 'you got married', is presupposed. In (38), on the other hand, they are assertives and the complement clause is not presupposed.

Another characteristic of semifactives which share with other assertives but not with any true factives is that their complements are "weakly" presupposed.¹⁶ Consider, for instance, the following sentence:

(40)a *den ida oti bike i meri*
I didn't see (notice) that Mary came in

In the preferred reading what is negated is the main proposition *den ida* and the complement remains constant i.e. it is a true proposition. There are cases, however, when an element of the complement clause can be negated too i.e. either *bike* or *meri*, as for instance when I am contradicting someone who insists that I have seen *Mary* coming in and I imply that it *wasn't* *Mary* but somebody else that I saw:

¹⁶ As it might be expected (41)a can have a *to* clitic whereas (41)b cannot; *to ksero oti iparxi diafora*, **to ksero na iparxi diafora*, that is with a *na* complement, *ksero* cannot become a focus.

(40)b *den ida oti bike i meri ala i eleni*
I didn't see (notice) that *Mary* came in but that *Helen* did.
Thus *ida* may or may not have its complement presupposed.

The ambiguity of a sentence like (40) casts doubts on the claim that a proposition may not be both asserted and presupposed in a single token. A more thorough study of discourse may lead to a revision of this theory.

Like all the weak assertives, and some of the strong assertives, the semifactives can have a *na* complement too. This happens whenever a weak opinion about the truth of the complement is expressed:

(41)a *ksero oti iparxi mja diafora anamesa tus*
I know that there is a difference between them
b *ksero na iparxi mja diafora namesa tus*
I know there to be a difference between them

Sentence (41)a has on one reading its complement presupposed. In sentence (41)b the speaker never commits himself to the truth of the complement proposition.

Pure Factives

We have seen that the semifactives are weakly presupposed and that there are cases when a non-factive interpretation may be assigned to them. Stress and negation can alter their complements as far as commitment to their truth is concerned.

What characterizes the pure factives is that their complement proposition remains constant under any conditions. Thus the negated factives below do not alter the complement proposition *pandreftike i meri* 'Mary got married'.

(42)a *den lipame*
I am not sorry
b *den stenoxorjeme*
I don't bother *pu pandreftike i meri.*
c *den metrai*
It doesn't count *that Mary got married.*
d *den exi simasia*
It is not important

As far as their syntax is concerned, we notice that unlike the semifactive class, they allow of no complement preposing with subsequent parenthesization of the main proposition:

ksexno
I forget

- (43) *i meri pandreftike, stenoxorjeme
 Mary got married I bother
 metrai
 It counts

The complementizer for all factives is *pu*. Some of the predicates of this class of factives, the so-called emotive, can take a participial complement (Adverbial Participle) provided that they are not impersonal expressions.

- (44)a lipiðika maðenondas ta nea
 Participle
 I was sorry to hear the news
 b stenoxoriðika vlepondas ton
 Participle
 I felt sorry when I saw him him

The participial complement following such predicates is a verb of perception. This is a case when the complement clause has a non-finite verb.

Pure factives can be followed by a *na* complement. A subjunctival complement does affect the factivity of the complement. Normally the *na* complement of factive predicates, when in the 2nd person singular has a generic meaning and no commitment to the truth of the complement is involved. Compare:

- (45)a metrai *pu* exis ðiploma xoru
 It counts (the fact) that you have a diploma in dancing
 b metrai *na* exis ðiploma xoru

Sentence (45)a refers to the addressee himself and to the fact that he has got a diploma in dancing. In sentence (45)b on the other hand, the second singular has a generic meaning though it may include the addressee as well. A good paraphrase (45)a will have *to oti* in place of *pu*; one of (45)b will contain the conditional conjunction *an* 'if' instead of *na* again preceded by an article.

- (46)a metrai *to oti* exis ðiploma xoru
 b metrai *to an* exis ðiploma xoru

A *pu* complement always presupposes the truth of the complement whereas a *na* subjunctival one expresses a hypothesis.

We have discussed the semantics of the complement clauses. Our analysis though based on Hooper's observations has followed another line and has underlined the importance of focus and stress in classifying predicates into assertives and non-assertives. Some of our findings are a) Indicative Mood is the mood of assertive predicates; b) assertive predicates are the only predicates capable of having a parenthetical reading on which the main proposition of a sentence is semantically subordinated and the complement proposition

becomes the main assertion of the sentence. Pace the Kiparskys, however, there is no clear cut line between factives and nonfatives since representative nonfactive predicates (weak assertives) can have their complement clause presupposed if heavily stressed (*fenete*) or, heavily stressed and in a past tense (*perimena*, *ipeðesa*, *fandastika*). Apart from this fact, there is the case of the semifactives which are ambiguous between one reading on which their complement is presupposed, and then they function as factives and another reading on which their complement is not presupposed in which case they function as assertive-nonfatives.

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