

REVIEWS

Introducing phonology. By Peter Hawkins. Pp. 326. London: Hutchinson, 1984.
Reviewed by Włodzimierz Sobkowiak, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań.

P. Hawkins's *Introducing phonology* contains 10 chapters, a preface, a list of transcription symbols, a glossary of phonetic terms, notes, a bibliography and an index, altogether filling 326 pages. After a general introduction (chapter 1: "Phonemic and phonetic", 35 pages) the author passes on to discuss phonotactics of English (ch. 2: "Phonemes in sequence", 23 pp.) and the theory of distinctive features (ch. 3, 30 pp.). Chapter 4, as its title suggests is devoted to the treatment of a number of intricate theoretical issues: "Neutralization, marking and language universals" (23 pp.), as is chapter 5, entitled "Phonology and morphology" (35 pp.), where elements of English morphophonemics are presented and some theoretical approaches compared (classical, generative and natural generative). An extended discussion of connected speech phenomena follows in chapter 6 (30 pp.). The remaining chapters hold: a thorough treatment of English intonation (ch. 7, 33 pp.), a discussion of dialect and accent (ch. 8, 25 pp.), of sound change (ch. 9, 25 pp.) and of the acquisition of phonology in children (ch. 10, 22 pp.).

As "the book is intended as an introductory course for first or second year university students or the equivalent" (p. 7), it automatically locates itself in the microcosm of phonology textbooks and is best reviewed with reference to it.

Textbook writing is notoriously a matter of trade-off and conflict between precision and detail on the one hand and clarity and width of scope on the other. Once a general approach is taken here, some other essential decisions are automatically made: the degree of theoretical bias allowed, the amount of historical background introduced, the number of problem-solving activities included, etc. Hawkins's book is a clinical example of this phenomenon.

First, there are places where accuracy is quite obviously sacrificed to clarity and succinctness. On page 69 *phonemic* is equalled to "what the speaker knows about his language" and *phonetic* — to "what the speaker actually does". This is set in the context of English phonotactic constraints, with speakers 'knowing' that e.g. /-aiŋ/ is a disallowed cluster and yet producing it in /flaiŋ/ *flying*. Without, however, a brief demonstration of the senses in which the term 'know' may be used in linguistics, a reader will still be in the dark about how one can possibly 'do' more than one can 'know'.

Another example comes from the treatment of neutralization. If "neutralization can be said to occur *only* [Hawkins's emphasis — WS] if there is uncertainty about the identity of the sound in the position of neutralization" (p. 112) on the part of the speakers, like for the second sound of *speak*, *steak* or *ski* in English, then how could the Prague phonologists invoke neutralization to explain word-final voicelessness, where it is expressly "the voiceless sound which occurs" (p. 116)?

Is /n/ → /m/ an instance of assimilation (on page 184 it is explicitly shown under this heading) or coarticulation ("coarticulations describe sub-phonemic, i. e. allophonic, effects, whereas assimilations involve an exchange [...] of phoneme" — p. 189)?

Sometimes inaccuracy seems to be due to a sloppy use of terms. Notice the particularly unfortunate use of *distinctive* in the following statement about /g/-dropping in the history of English: "words like *sing* and *rung* were doubly distinct from *sin* and *run*: through the presence of [g], and the distinctive allophone [ŋ]".

Another trade-off typically encountered in textbook writing is that between a thorough presentation of historical background (so-called 'schools') and a flat, unidimensional, but clearer, synchronic view of the discipline. Hawkins is close to the latter extreme, which entails considerable simplification in the exposition of some theoretical issues, especially in chapters 4 and 5. Thus, what we learn about generative phonology for example (towards which Hawkins is 'sympathetic' — p. 8) is a loose collection of facts and bits of information with no unified statement of its spatio-temporal whereabouts and fundamental tenets. While such discussion would entail some complication in the flow of exposition, the achieved simplicity is delusive, with such openings as: "In orthodox generative phonology ..." (p. 54) bound to confuse the uninitiated reader. After all, good historical introductions to phonology are sparse (Fischer-Jørgensen 1975 being a notable exception here).

Unlike many other writers of phonology textbooks (e. g.: Harms 1968, Hyman 1975 or Gussmann 1980 — all of them — significantly — generativists) Hawkins strives to avoid excessive theoretical bias and is amazingly successful in doing so. This is especially to be cherished in view of the continuing dominance of generative phonology manuals like Schane 1973, Sommerstein 1977 or Kenstowicz and Kisseberth 1979. Reminders like "many phonologists prefer ..." or "not all phonologists interpret the data in the same way" abound in the book, repeatedly drawing the reader's attention to the fact that phonology is a science of interpretation and not of discovery, and that it thrives on argument and dispute. All of classical phonemics, Prague phonology and generative phonology receive a hearing. One unexpected omission in a book written by a speech therapist is that of natural phonology. Only Stampe 1969 is given in the Bibliography, with such names as Dressler, for example, conspicuously lacking.

While expressly balancing the theoretical bias, Hawkins is surprisingly taciturn as far as metatheoretical issues are concerned (something nicely elucidated in Lass 1984). While he appears to be a fairly orthodox inductionist, this is never openly admitted, and the reader might be left wondering, e. g., why one should discuss distinctive features in terms of phonological processes and not vice versa (p. 103).

The analysis of data forms an integral part of the book and appropriate exercises are interspersed with the flow of argument (unlike in Sloat et al. 1978 or Kenstowicz and Kisseberth 1979). The reliance on English in this respect is at times excessive, reflecting, however, the author's decision explained in the Preface. Non-English readers (Poles in particular!) may be surprised to find out that unaspirated voiceless plosives, for example, are phonetically half-way between voiceless and voiced. What holds good for English may not do so generally. In fact, "Introducing English phonology" would probably be a more adequate title, especially as the problems of description and analysis are treated much more extensively than theory proper.

There are some obvious errors of fact. Contrary to what is claimed on p. 69, the *-ing* suffix is not reduced to /ŋ/ in *drawing*. If *ships* and *knobs* /ʃipS, nobS/ have an archiphoneme as the realization of the plurality morpheme, so should *tins* and *plums*, which are given as /tinz/ and /plAmz/ on page 127. If /w/ is inserted after "[u] — gliding diphthongs", then this is hardly explicit in [tʃuwiŋ] (p. 175).

The amount of misprints is negligible (*onomatopaeic* on p. 69, *Davidson-Nielsen* on p. 112, italic *t* and *d* in data on p. 186), but the number of mis-references is surprisingly high. The following are a selection:

page	reference	bibliography
32	H. Palmer	?
33	B. de Courtenay 1895	?
62	Hooper 1973	1972
112	Lehmann 1953	?
178	Pike 1946	1945
192	Lehiste 1979	1977
256	Stampe 1972	?
312	Hyman 1973a	no 'b'

While not free from inaccuracies and imperfections, and all the above criticism notwithstanding, the book is probably one of the best in the category of textbooks specifically catering for undergraduates. The language is clear, there are lots of examples and data-oriented exercises, and the amount of details is kept at a manageable level. Thanks to these qualities the book compares favourably with Hyman 1975, Lass 1984 or Rubach 1982, all of them guilty of at times allowing excessive detail and theoretical bias. What is especially to be appreciated in Hawkins is the elsewhere unseen comprehensive treatment of fast and casual speech — an excellent testing ground for phonological hypotheses and the kind of substantive evidence which is particularly persuasive to university students, being readily accessible to observation.

Introducing phonology should be greeted with an especially warm welcome by Polish students and teachers of descriptive grammar of English. While some of the exercises are aimed specifically at the native English speaker, most of the properties of this book (as singled out above) make it eminently suitable for use in teaching English phonology to Polish students.

On the whole, then, Hawkins's book, while hardly a state-of-the-art report or reference source for specialists, is a well-balanced and clearly laid-out introduction to the ever-developing field of contemporary phonology.

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Relevance. Communication and Cognition. By Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. Pp. viii+279. Oxford: Blackwell. 1986. Reviewed by Andreas H. Jucker, University of Zürich.

One of the most controversial issues ever since the publication of part of Grice's William James' Lectures (Grice 1975) has been the ontological status of the conversational maxims. Grice listed four maxims (based on Kant), split up into nine submaxims, all spelling out in detail what he called the cooperative principle (CP). The question then was whether a further refinement of the cooperative principle would require (or allow for) an increase or a decrease of the number of maxims, or should the number stay invariant?

Leech (1983) gives a sophisticated demonstration of how the CP can be refined by increasing the number of maxims. He added a politeness principle (PP) with several submaxims to Grice's CP. The PP can explain utterances in which the speaker blatantly violates the CP because in the context of the utterance it seems more polite to do so. S and W, on the other hand, reduce the number of maxims to just one, i. e. the principle of relevance (PR). Such an approach had already been outlined by e. g. S and W (1981), Wilson and Sperber (1981), Atlas and Levinson (1981), Levinson (1986).

Such a reductionist approach immediately provokes the question as to how it can lead to greater sophistication? Does the PR apply to all kinds of activity types or just to ordinary everyday conversation as Grice's CP? And can it explain e. g. Leech's data of polite behaviour?

The main thesis of the book is that communicative behaviour always carries a tacit guarantee of relevance, i. e. a person who wants to communicate, either verbally or non-verbally, assumes that what she¹ wants to make manifest is of relevance to her audience and that it is worth the audience's while to process that particular piece of information (p. 50). Such behaviour which makes manifest the speaker's intention to inform is called 'ostensive behaviour' or simply 'ostension'. It carries two layers of information; the information to be picked up by the audience and the speaker's intention to convey this information.

The PR is developed against the background of a theory of communication expounded in chapter 1. It is based on two theories of communication that are often felt to be mutually exclusive, i. e. the code theory and the inferential theory. According to the code theory communication, whether verbal or non-verbal, is an exchange of information via a fixed code and based on encoding and decoding. In this model, successful communication depends on whether speaker and hearer have got access to some shared background of common knowledge (mutual knowledge hypothesis). Mutual knowledge requires speaker and hearer not only to be able to make e. g. the same reference assignments in an utterance, but also to be sure that they both made the same assignments, i. e. that they both talk about the same thing(s). Both have to be certain about the correct assignments and about the fact that the other participant also made the correct assignments. "Mutual knowledge must be certain, or else it does not exist; and since it can never be certain it can never exist" (p. 19f).

The inferential model, on the other hand, assumes that communication is achieved by communicators producing and interpreting evidence. Communicators produce evidence about their intentions, for instance their intention to inform the audience of some facts. Two intentions are involved; the so called informative intention, which is the

¹ I adopt S and W's convention to assume — for ease of exposition — that the speaker is female and the hearer is male.

intention to inform the reader of some facts, and the so called communicative intention, which is the intention that the hearer may recognise the informative intention (p. 29). Both models are needed in their own rights because they correspond to two different modes of communication. However, it is important to realise, S and W point out, that the inferential model is not just an amendment of the code model. On the contrary, inferential communication is rather more basic, and codes are merely employed to simplify, or, in unproblematic situations, to bypass inferential processes. S and W replace the notion of 'mutual knowledge' by 'cognitive environment' and 'mutual manifestness'.

In chapter 2, which may be rather more difficult to follow for anyone without specialised knowledge in the field of cognitive psychology and logic, S and W give an outline of their inferential model of communication. The central chapter of the book, chapter 3, deals with the concept of relevance itself. An assumption is the more relevant, the more it has effects on the cognitive environment of the hearer, and it is the more relevant, the less processing effort it incurs for the hearer (p. 125). An assumption may be irrelevant in some given context because it does not connect with any information which is already present in the context, because exactly the same assumption is already present in the context, or because it is inconsistent with such information and too weak to upset the information already present (p. 121). The concept of relevance is further developed by discussing how a hearer chooses a context to process new information. S and W stress the point that the context is not given prior to the processing of information, as it is commonly assumed in the literature (references on p. 261, fn. 4), on the contrary it is selected so that it allows for optimal processing, which means that there should be a good balance between the effects and the efforts of this processing.

In chapter 4, S and W put their theory to test and present — within the framework of relevance theory — analyses of various problem areas of present day linguistics such as metaphorical and literal use of language, irony or speech acts. Consequently this turns out to be the most interesting part of the book for linguists and in particular for pragmatists. Their discussion of the notion 'given-new', or 'topic-comment', may serve as an example. They show how this notoriously difficult problem of defining e. g. 'topic' receives a perfectly straightforward treatment in their framework because 'topic' is not treated as a formal category but as a functional category called 'foreground implication', which is opposed to 'background implication'. Thus it is assumed that an utterance like (1).

(1) Paul signed his new contract.

is interpreted by the hearer in real time in such a way that the initial noun phrase *Paul* restricts the possible continuations, on the assumption that *contract* receives a focal stress. This processing gives rise to the set of anticipatory logical hypotheses (2):

- (2) (a) Paul did something / What did Paul do?
- (b) Paul signed something/What did Paul sign?
- (c) Paul signed his new contract.

All these implications, processed in turn, can contribute to the overall relevance of the entire utterance (1). They may do this by reducing the required processing effort or by adding some contextual effect. Those implications that merely reduce processing effort are called background implications, and those that have contextual effects of their own foreground implications (p. 209). The important point is that the speaker "need have no specific intention about which of the implications of her utterance are foreground and

which background (which are given and which are new), contrary to what is normally accepted in the literature" (p. 210).

S and W's Relevance is thus not only a refinement of Grice's theory of conversation but the ambitious attempt "to lay the foundation for a unified theory of cognitive science" (cover text). Grice's CP is designed to account for those assumptions that are only implicated but not explicitly expressed in an utterance. S and W's PR, on the other hand, accounts both for the implicit and the explicit part of what is communicated. Thus it can justifiably claim to be a more comprehensive and more general theory of communication.

The PR applies to all kinds of ostensive communication and communicators do not have the choice, as they have with the CP, either to adhere to it or to violate it in order to achieve certain effects. Every act of ostensive behaviour comes with the implicit guarantee that the communicator deems the communicated information relevant, i. e. worth processing for the hearer. Obviously a communicator might be wrong in her evaluation of the worth of the information for the hearer. It might turn out that the required amount of effort is much too high (for instance an unintelligible lecture) or the contextual effect much too small (a boring lecture) or irrelevant because unrelated to any available context (a lecture in the wrong faculty). But the communicator (the lecturer in this example) always intends to be relevant, otherwise they might not really be said to communicate at all. At first sight filibusterers seem to be an exception to this rule. They talk and talk and talk without any apparent informative intention. However, on closer inspection, this is not so. For a filibusterer it is important to keep talking. The unusual point about filibusterers is merely the fact that their informative intention appears to be unrelated to what they say, and therefore they do not really engage in verbal communication in spite of producing words and sentences.

Another important difference to Grice's theory is the exclusion of the analyst's intuition. Implicatures are not set up by the intuition of the analyst and *ex post facto* justified by the theory, but they are recoverable via an inference process (p. 200). The plausibility of an implicature depends on its accessibility to the hearer. "According to relevance theory, the correct interpretation of an ostensive stimulus is the first accessible interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance." (p. 178). This sounds plausible enough but it opens up the very serious question about the accessibility of the interpretations. No explanation is offered, or could possibly have been offered, on how the accessibility is calculated. S and W are aware of this (p. 170), but they accept this "weakness" because it is a problem of cognitive psychology as a whole and not just of relevance theory. However, one might claim that this weakness threatens the whole theory by letting in the intuition of the analyst through the back door, as it were. After all it is again the analyst's intuition which has to decide which is the first accessible interpretation that is consistent with the PR. But such a reasoning is in all probability unfair to S and W because they make it much clearer where the analyst's intuition has to fill in what we — as yet — lack in knowledge. And to account for the accessibility of assumptions is a problem which exists on independent grounds in the field of cognitive psychology.

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Forms and Meanings of the Verbs contained in MS. Bodley 34. Publications de l'Association des Médiévistes Anglicistes de l'Enseignement Supérieur, vol. 7. By Juliette De Caluwé-Dor. Pp. 432. Paris: AMAES, 1982. Reviewed by Bernhard Diensberg, University of Vienna.

This book has been a long time in the making. It represents the author's doctoral dissertation, undertaken at the suggestion of the late Professor S. d'Ardenne, University of Liège, in 1968. Dr. De Caluwé-Dor tells us in the French Foreword that she was not able to consult her teacher's diplomatic transcript of MS Bodley 34 before its publication in 1977. She rightly rejects Einkenkel's edition of *Seinte Katerine* (henceforth SK) and informs the reader that she made her own transcription of SK from the manuscript (p. 17f.). After the publication of an entirely new edition of SK by Professors S. T. R. O. d'Ardenne and E. J. Dobson in 1981 De Caluwé-Dor checked her transcription against the new edition of SK (p. 18). However, no reference is made to it in her bibliography (p. 21–28).

In the "Preface" (pp. 9–15) we are given a short overview of the research done in connection with the so-called AB-language represented by MS Corpus Christi College Cambridge 402 of the *Ancrene Wisse* (A) and MS Bodley 34 of the *Katherine Group* (B). I am sceptical whether the chronological classification for Middle English, i. e. 1100 to 1400 (p. 9) will find universal acceptance. In fact, "Middle English Dialect Characteristics and Dialect Boundaries" by Moore, Meech and Whitehall is no longer the 'Bible of Middle English dialectology', a view with which the author readily concurs. The considerable shortcomings and deficiencies of this study have recently been pointed out by J. Fisiak (1985 : 257–280).

Under the heading "Arrangement of the Verbs" (pp. 17–19) Dr. De Caluwé-Dor states her intention to produce a glossary of the verbs attested in Bodley 34, giving the references to folio and line of the manuscript (p. 17). She then explains the arrangement of the entries in her glossary, where "The first subdivision under each infinitive is an exhaustive list of all the forms found in the manuscript." (p. 18). As the head-form of any entry is to be the infinitive she runs into trouble whenever this form is not attested, but related prefixed forms and verbal compounds are found. The author does not seem to distinguish between prefixation and verbal compounds of the type *gristbeatien* (p. 172), **cnawlechin* and **icnawlechin* (p. 90f.) co-occurring with *neolechin* (p. 264) and **uncumelechin* (p. 384).

Nevertheless, these compound verbs are listed alphabetically, while simplex verbs precede verbs with a preverb. Different prefixed verbs are again given in alphabetical order, e. g. *awarpen* and **ouerwarpen* come after the simplex *warpen* (pp. 391f.). At

any rate Dr. De Caluwé-Dor does not distinguish between separable preverbs of the type *ouer*, *þurh* (as in *þurlin* and *þurh-þurlin*, p. 382f.) and inseparable preverbs like *ed-* and *to-* attested in **edbreoken* and **tobreoken*, which are related to the simplex *breoken* (p. 74f.). There is a list of unattested simplex verbs at the end of the book (p. 18). Her practice of listing prefixed verbs for which no simplex verbs are attested alphabetically, e. g. *acouerin* under *a-* (p. 32), while *abuggen* — as pointed out above — will be found after *buggen* (p. 78), seemed quite irritating to the reviewer.

It is also hard to see why gerundial forms are not included in the glossary of the verb forms of Bodley 34. Although these forms are clearly nominal as to their word class membership they would more often than not illustrate stems, for which no other forms are found, e. g. *Hali Meidhad* (henceforth HM) *wlecchunge* 'state of lukewarmness' (Millett 1982: 22/13 and 83b) — in fact, the glossary only contains *iwlaht* past participle of **wlecchen* (p. 412) from *Seinte Iulienne* (henceforth SJ) (d'Ardenne 1961 : 107; Diensberg 1981 : 228).

I cannot agree with Dr. De Caluwé-Dor's *sparki* 1st pers. sg. instead of *sperki* which is the genuine AB-form (see Diensberg 1981 : 227). Thus, OE *spearcian* is, in fact, the etymon of the Early Middle English forms quoted (p. 326; d'Ardenne 1961 : 184).

As to SK *bigen* (1/14), an erroneous reading by Einkenel 1884 : 3/31 (note), for regular *bigon* (p. 59), the author states that the manuscript is not clear. However, d'Ardenne (1977 : 17) points out that an *e*-like letter for *o* repeatedly occurs in MS Bodley 34 (Diensberg 1981 : 228).

Under the past tense forms of *shal* (p. 290f.) Dr. De Caluwé-Dor preserves the odd spelling *schude* (SK 6/1) which should be corrected to *sculde* — thus *Seinte Marherete* (henceforth SM) 17/1 (see Diensberg 1981 : 228). Likewise *cost* (SM 31/10) should be amended to *const*, the usual form of the 2nd person sg. of *cunnen* (p. 98; see Diensberg 1981 : 228). SK 13v/5 *chakten* 'caught' (p. 211) should be corrected to *cahten* (thus d'Ardenne and Dobson 1981 : 102/716 and 317b).

It would be preferable to call *ofseruin* 'to deserve' (p. 313) a hybrid formation rather than a 'half-translation'. OE *-læcan* (p. 384) given under **uncumelechīn*, 4, (length is not marked, although given earlier) is certainly not a *suffix* (see ME *-lechin*) but a verbal element, although never attested as a simplex. Dr. De Caluwé-Dor, however, considers a postnominal derivation in the case of *uncumeleched* 'makes uncomely' from ME *uncumelich* adj. thus attributing the verb form to the 2nd class of weak verbs.

On p. 17, line 20 read 5/2 instead of 5/7 (=line 2 of folio 5 recto). SK (p. 17) as an acronym for *Seinte Katerine* is not expanded; see, however, Einkenel 1884 on p. 23.

Although the origin of the verbs quoted in her glossary is not the main point of the book under review, the fourth subdivision of each entry purports to give the etymology of the verb concerned (p. 19). Dr. De Caluwé-Dor gives the form of the verb if attested in the *Vespasian Psalter* (henceforth VP), which is commonly regarded as the ancestor of the AB-dialect to be localized in the West Midlands (p. 11f.). In other cases she simply gives the corresponding West Saxon (henceforth WS) form thus following A. Zettersten (1965) in his study of the dialect of the *Ancrene Riwe* (quoted on p. 11 and 13). This policy may lead her into trouble not only in cases like HM *falewi(n)* 'to wither' (p. 133) where the corresponding Anglian form can easily be derived from WS *fealwian* (Zettersten 1965 : 47).

This is the case of AB *sulen* 'to soil' (p. 347f.), which would yield **sulien* if derived from OE *sylian* (thus Zettersten 1965 : 153). A derivation from OF/AF *soillier/suiller* 'to defile' seems much more likely (Diensberg 1985a : 69f.). Regarding the tonic vowel of AB *schuppen* 'to create' (p. 300 the author wrongly assumes influence from Late WS *scyppan*. It is, however, generally agreed that VP *sceppan* became **scyppan* through an

independent combinatory change (thus d'Ardenne 1961 : 164). This view is also accepted by Zettersten (1965 : 152). Supposedly WS loanwords in the West-Mercian AB-dialect can be explained otherwise as the present reviewer has tried to show elsewhere (Diensberg 1978 : 447ff.).

I doubt whether Dr. De Caluwé-Dor's assumed etymological convergence of several verbs of different chronology and provenance helps to clarify the still unknown origin of SK *druicninde* 'being dejected' (14/3). Besides, the AB-dialect never has the digraph *ui* for OE *ȳ* (Zettersten 1965 : 160f. and 232). Consequently, d'Ardenne and Dobson rightly emend this form to **druicninde* 'swooning' (1981 : 269 and 305b). Likewise *pleien* 'to play' (p. 273) cannot go back to VP **plægian* as it would be spelt **pleaien* in AB (see Zettersten 1965 : 63, s. v. *dreaieð* and *forgneaieð*). *Pleien* clearly continues OE *pleg(i)an* (Zettersten 1965 : 88).

AB *crunin* 'to crown' (p. 94f.) is certainly not a blend of OF *coroner* and ON *krýna*, which may itself go back to the OF verb (see AEW : 332b and 332a, s. v. *krúna* 'Krone' (<Latin *corōna*)). It clearly continues Anglo-French (henceforth AF) *coro(u)ner/curuner* 'to crown, etc.' (AND : 116b). The elision of the vowel of the pretonic syllable of the OF/AF verb may be a rather exceptional development. It is, however, paralleled by AF *grucer*, *-cher*, *-cier* 'to begrudge' (AND : 344a) and its family, which continues Latin **corruptiāre* (see Diensberg 1975 : 233, footnote 4) and corresponds to OF *corecier/corocier* — Modern French *courroucer* (Bloch/Wartburg : 164f.).

AB *hercnin* 'to listen' goes back to OE *heorcnian*, not *hercnian* as the author wrongly prints (p. 199). OE *-eor* + velar consonant is regularly smoothed to *-er* (Zettersten 1965 : 90). AB *eggīn* 'to incite' (p. 128) is generally assumed to go back to ON *eggja* (see Zettersten 1965 : 74). Thus, late OE *eggian* is to be derived from the Scandinavian verb and there cannot be any question of etymological convergence. In the case of Early ME *deien* 'to die' ON *deyja* is not considered the only possible etymological source as Dr. De Caluwé-Dor seems to believe (p. 108). A native origin for this word has recently been proposed by H. Peters (1981 : 107–108).

Finally, it is hard to see how SM *astenche* 'assail with stench' (p. 38f.) can be derived from OE *āstencan* meaning 'to scatter' (thus Bosworth/Toller/Suppl. 52b). Anyway, the author's semantic derivation seems singularly farfetched. She quotes, however, VP **tō-stencan* (meaning not given), which is rendered by 'to scatter, disperse, dissipate, bring to naught' (Mertens-Fonck 1960 : 295).

The present writer has compared the readings and translations of the verb forms occurring in HM according to B. Millett's recent edition of 1982 (see review by Diensberg 1985b : 182–184) to the corresponding forms in Dr. De Caluwé-Dor's glossary. There do not seem to be any major disagreements. In spite of the criticisms raised above her work will remain a very useful tool for further research within the field of AB-philology.

ABBREVIATIONS

AEW	Altnordisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch (see below de Vries 1977)
AF	Anglo-French
AND	Anglo-Norman Dictionary (see below Stone et al. 1977ff.)
ME	Middle English
MS	Manuscript
OE	Old English
OF	Old French
ON	Old Norse

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Complementation in Middle English and the Methodology of Historical Syntax: A Study of the Wyclifite Sermons. By Anthony Warner. Pp. 266. University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1982. Reviewed by Ruta Nagucka, The Jagiellonian University of Cracow.

The subject of this monograph is of great importance both in the analysis and interpretation of the complex syntactic phenomena in ME prose and for its methodological significance to the theory of historical research. It is a revised version of an academic dissertation which is meant to advance a new approach to diachronic investigation in general, and to offer an insightful analysis of a historical text according to this method in particular. In my report on this rather ambitiously conceived study I shall concentrate on the following aspects: (1) theoretical assumptions and methodological considerations, (2) the syntactic analysis and account of the complement constructions in Middle English, and (3) the study of the Wyclifite sermons.

(1) Among the interesting points Warner makes in his Preface is a statement that this study is "intended to bridge the gap" between philological and linguistic traditions by synthesizing these two approaches. He claims that neither is satisfactory because the philological tradition, concentrating on the analysis of the text, avoids linguistic interpretation while "a more recent linguistic tradition", being interested in the grammatical problems, "often fails to appreciate the limitations of textual evidence and the kind of careful interpretation that it needs before grammatical conclusions can be drawn" (Preface). I find myself in agreement with Warner that synchronic data-based analyses be fundamental for historical interpretations, but I would not easily share his critical appraisal. If by the "philological tradition" we also mean structuralism then the — apparent, as is often the case — lack of interest in the explanation of grammatical structures is in a sense justified by the theoretical assumptions on which the analyses were based. Any structural descriptive analysis of a historical text not only avoids explanations and semantic considerations (if this is what Warner means by "questions of linguistic interpretation") but simply rejects them as not explicitly justifiable. It is true that a more recent tradition (i. e., transformational grammar, I assume) is preoccupied with grammatical, universal characteristics of language, and it is also true that in accordance with the theoretical bases, synchronic analyses of contemporary data need not be corpus-based in the distributional sense. Most transformational analyses of historical texts, however, have been preceded by very careful and thorough scrutinies, and historical linguists of transformational orientation do perceive the worth and necessity of textual evidence (see, for instance, Traugott's works, which Warner has in his bibliography).

There is no doubt about dangers, deficiencies and difficulties of various kind which a historical linguist has to face, and Warner very aptly shows that all types of information are adequate for a synchronic interpretation of a historical text (distribution, translation, knowledge of general linguistics or comparison with other languages). All these aspects "become mutually supporting factors in the analysis," says Warner (5). I only wonder about his emphasis on the role of frequency of constructions and of the parallelism of grammatical structure to the corresponding ones found in present-day English. To confirm a hypothesis, is it really necessary to know with what frequency a given structure occurred? A justification of the appropriateness of statistical procedures and computations, as well as an explanation of symbols and formulas, would have clarified the discussion. Neither does it seem theoretically indispensable, although methodologically justifiable, to build "an interpretation of the ME situation on data from ME and PE (present-day English) in the light of general theory" (5). There is a follow up to this

rather bold statement in subsequent chapters when frequent references to present-day English are being made. The reliability of such methodology does not always receive sufficient comment and statements such as "a roughly similar situation in PE" (5) or "a partial parallel with PE" (87) are too vague to be valid for corpus-oriented research.

I have pointed out some controversial points of the methodology suggested by Warner rather than the constructive sides, which obviously outnumber the others. Being extremely cautious, Warner very praise-worthily considers and tests various methods, which may help him to adequately interpret a historical text in an explicit and objective way, utilizing structural tools as well as transformational apparatus. His cautiousness manifests itself also in his surface-oriented approach as "any account of the grammar of a dead language must necessarily present and discuss surface syntax and only rather cautiously attempt more abstract analyses", he says (8). In analysing and discussing the historical data, Warner never appeals to intuition, which he rejects in diachronic research, and uses instead the instincts of the grammarian "about the naturalness of analyses" (4), which concept, regretfully, he has not clarified nor enlarged upon. Setting doubts aside, his method has a solid foundation supported occasionally by psycholinguistic (e. g. perceptual needs) and sociolinguistic factors and, if carried out in a meticulous and sensible manner, could produce revealing results.

(2) Following the theoretical and methodological assumptions advocated in the Introduction, Warner undertakes an analysis of complements in Middle English. Of eight chapters, six are devoted to such problems as: general preliminaries to an interpretation of ME complementation, derivation and distribution of complement clauses, infinitive marking, finite and nonfinite clauses, *þat ne* — clauses; in other words, the study deals with noun clauses, indirect questions, and infinitives used in a nominal function.

A detailed analysis with an attempt to look at the problem also from the point of view of present-day English results in such interesting observations as, for example, NP TO VP in late Middle English occurring syntactically more freely and distributionally more widely than in contemporary English. Another interesting point is that the surface NP TO VP in Middle English can be derived either from one (NP TO VP) or two (NP — TO VP) deep structure places, depending on whether a verb is followed by one or two objects. It may happen that a verb is susceptible to a double analysis, which is observationally adequate, but it raises important theoretical questions. Does such a verb, e. g. *þidde*, which can be interpreted mono- or ditransitively, inherently require one or two objects? And, further, what is the relationship between these two structures? Which of them, if any, is primary? Since the distinction depends on "semantic appropriacy", do we have two different lexical items which only accidentally share some characteristics? The author's views on these and similar problems, though difficult to prove statistically and distributionally, might have enriched the interpretation.

After having shown that all complement clauses can be traced back to NPs in the underlying structure, Warner goes through the rules which operate in the process of generating appropriate surface structures (movement, deletion, reordering). Separate chapters, each devoted to a different complement construction, consider and discuss topics of utmost importance, problems the solutions of which are still controversial, and Warner's contribution is very welcome. Take, for instance, the infinitive, which, in Middle English, can be marked by zero, *to* and *for to*. The author shows that there is no free variation of these uses and that the selection of one of the markers is dependent upon the lexical item and grammatical factors. When the author does not find enough evidence in the data he analyses he searches for it outside the main body; in his discussion on another kind of infinitive clauses (i. e., those after verbs of knowing, thinking and

declaring), he also takes into consideration some additional material and concludes that the Latin structure of the accusative and infinitive entered into English through a series of least noticeable changes. Interesting, and, above all, relevant to the development of the English language, are his analysis of the opposition between *shulde* and the inflectional subjunctive and his discussion of the presence or absence of *þat* in WH-clauses. These and quite a number of other findings, remarks and comments contribute considerably to our knowledge not only of the Wyclifite material but also to the history of English syntax.

(3) As the title informs, the book under review is a study of the Wyclifite sermons. There are several reasons why this material has been selected for analysis: it shows morphological and syntactic homogeneity, it constitutes a long prose text written in a standard literary dialect of the Central Midland area, it represents a sociolinguistically coherent type of language meant to be read aloud, etc. This kind of plain, learned English was influenced by Latin, and this Latin-relatedness provides Warner with some grounds for suggesting new solutions; for example, while interpreting nonfinite clauses after verbs of knowing, etc., Warner finds Latin parallels which allow him to postulate a mechanism of syntactic change involved in the development of this structure (for an interesting description of this process see pp. 147 ff.). Another example of dependence on Latin is shown by the history of *þat ne*-clauses (220 ff.). Since the corpus of data does not always offer a sufficiently ample amount of examples, Warner looks for additional samples in the Wyclifite Bible (the early and later versions).

Although Warner's study of complementation is based on strictly defined data, the book is not merely an analysis of Wyclifite prose and the conclusions are valid not only for the material under scrutiny. Rather, the investigation tends to consider grammatical problems of ME representative works within a broad framework of the history of English in order to account for the development of its standard variety.

Editorially, the book is excellent, neat and orderly; the examples are illustrative and understandable although some kind of typographical distinguisher for the constituents of the sentence under discussion would have made the presentation clearer. Very useful is the appendix, including the corpus, the matrix verbs and adjectives, as well as a general index. A final remark which I cannot resist making is a reference to a book by K. Kivimaa (247), whom Warner "pronominalizes" as *he*, while the person in question is a Finish lady linguist (Dr Kirsti Kivimaa).

The monograph by Anthony Warner is stimulating and interesting, independent in its argumentation and innovative in methodological approach, giving evidence of hard work and hard thinking and demanding the same from the reader.

Understanding language: towards a post-Chomskyan linguistics. By T. Moore and C. Carling. Pp. x + 225. London: MacMillan Press, 1982. Reviewed by Elżbieta Chrzanowska, The Jagiellonian University of Cracow.

The book under review is an outgrowth of regular discussions held from 1978 in Cambridge by a group of linguists dissatisfied with the Chomsky-dominated framework of contemporary linguistics. This, in fact, is not amazing, for Chomsky's theory has suffered various forms of criticism since its very inception. The title of the book suggests, however, that Moore and Carling (hereafter M and C) view Chomsky's model of grammar and his overall theory of language as slowly approaching its "technical death". At times their criticism of Chomsky assumes rather sharp accents, but generally the book is an orderly presentation of M and C's objections against Chomskyan theory of language. The book is subdivided into Prologue, Part I, Interlude, Part II, and Epilogue.

"Prologue" is a summary of main vetoes against the Chomsky-style linguistics, which nail down to the following points:

- 1) *Divergence* between a highly technical formal apparatus introduced by Chomsky to studies of language and its poor explanatory results, reflected in a high number of "unsolved mysteries" in language production and perception. The attack against the deductive method for investigation of linguistics as a social science is, indeed, the book's leitmotif.
- 2) *Excessive concern with the form* of grammar, not backed up by proper empirical confirmation. For M and C Chomsky's empirical material is irrelevant, that is bearing on marginal issues of language and leaving out of consideration the main body of language.
- 3) *Incongruence* of Chomsky's theory, by which the authors mean a gap between language as an idealised object (actually, overidealised) and its non-idealised counterpart used in communication.
- 4) *Neglect of meaning*, which for M and C is vital for language-functioning, notwithstanding its subjective and elusive character. They also argue that all hitherto made attempts of integrating meaning into grammar have been abortive for the simple reason that semantics calls for different modes of investigation than syntax.
- 5) No "purely linguistic" knowledge can be claimed to exist: language is inseparable from our beliefs, knowledge, and attitudes (which together M and C call the "supportive framework" of language). M and C's chief concern is language-in-use.
- 6) *Meaning* is not an inherent property of words and sentences (i. e. contained in them), but an *emergent property*, influenced by our store of information about the world in general.
- 7) *Pragmatics*, though the authors sympathize with it, has been *not radical enough* in that it never questioned the relevance of existing formal models of language, but tried only to adjust itself to them.

Part I is split into three chapters. Chapter 1: "Historical Connections" tries to demonstrate that Chomsky's work may have been "innovative and evolutionary" but not "revolutionary" (p. 4). Chomsky's merit (for M and C, however, a demerit) was only the adoption of a reductive hypothetico-deductive model instead of induction. But his predecessors, both traditional and structural grammarians, forced upon Chomsky a narrow view of language as "context-independent and user-independent" (p. 19). M and C call it "a tradition...barren of insights" (p. 20) and, through carefully chosen quotations, try to convince the reader that both mathematisation of grammar, as well as the extension of corpus by predictive mechanisms as ideas go back to Harris and Hockett, who lent Chomsky some clues (p. 37) as to the future development of his theory. Thus, Chomsky, according to M and C, devised only a new mechanism for older conceptions of descriptivists.

Chapter 2: "Grammar and Explanation" discusses in some detail the question of inadequacy of deductive theories for linguistics. The authors stress the exaggerated importance assigned to form and exclusion of meaning, accompanied by a reductive character of Chomsky's theory, which disregards the supportive framework of knowledge and beliefs.

At this point, M and C bring forth one of gravest accusations against Chomsky: "Chomsky's preoccupation with the form of explanatory theories led him to attempt to mould subject matters to theory rather than develop a theoretical apparatus appropriate to his subject matter" (p. 51). The adoption of deductive reasoning predetermined syntax as the basic component of grammar and severely handicapped semantics, which, by its very nature, does not yield itself to a rigorous, formal treatment. Though Chomsky initially excluded semantics totally from his grammar, his theory was covertly based on it, since words, used as terminal symbols, are as such inseparable from meaning. "Words...have been Chomsky's Achilles' heel" (p. 82). Moreover, he "prematurely" jumped over to in-

ternal justification of grammar as decided by a universal theory, before justifying it externally. The authors refer to it as a "cavalier attitude" (p. 82), with no explanation actually provided for the majority of linguistic data. Chomsky, then, rendered his theory unverifiable and dependent on native speakers' intuitive judgements only, which undermined his entire model. What in fact can be empirically corroborated by Chomsky's model is only a "pale shadow of language" (p. 85).

Chapter 3: "Grammar and Mind" is the continuation of M and C's attacks, this time aimed at Chomsky's psychological speculations. Though admitting that the greatly stimulated the contacts between linguistics, philosophy, and psychology, they maintain that his model of competence was basically unproductive of deeper insights. They refer to a great part of Chomsky's theory that they reckon unsubstantiated by psychological experiments as "rhetoric". They do not question the innateness of competence as such, but rather point out the inadequacy of Chomsky's model that represents it. Also, they object to a narrow version of creativity as limited to syntax only, whereas flexibility, variability, and openness of language are most clearly displayed on its semantic level. M and C reject as well as assumption that rules uniform over grammars are uniform over languages. Hence, the second serious criticism is that Chomsky "conflated the terms 'grammar' and 'language' and the structure of his model with the structure of the mind" (p. 104). He also wrongly equated the child's problems in acquisition of language with those of a meta-grammarians devising abstract universal theories.

"Interlude" deals basically with problems of semantics, which in the later phase of development of Chomsky's model came to be, however inadequately, incorporated into grammar. M and C point out that, despite various efforts, we still lack an exhaustive repertoire of categories and features for a formal representation of meaning. What's more, Chomsky has never provided an algorithm for his derived constituent structures, which means that we have no proper translation rules from syntactic form to meaning. The authors contend additionally against the "dictionary view" of word meaning as a list of clearly-defined senses, claiming that meanings are generally indeterminate and the lexicon is only a "rough and ready instrument" (p. 130), based largely on our extra-linguistic experience.

Part II of the book, contrary to Part I, sketches a positive programme for future investigations. The major problem, as M and C perceive it, is "discovering exactly what we need to explain" in linguistics (p. 143).

Chapter 4: "Prerequisites for Understanding Language" develops the author's own approach to understanding of language functioning. They believe that language is not an autonomous system (cf. de Saussure's "language in and for itself", p. 88), but only an *epiphenomenon*, i. e. a non-autonomous entity, depending heavily on its users and their state of knowledge. Language thus plays an ancillary role in communication, where it can operate only due to an overlap between the supportive frameworks of interlocutors. M and C understand language to be a medium through which the speaker X causes the listener Y to gain access to his own store of knowledge and experience (p. 101). No meaning is conveyed from Y to Y, language functioning only as a tap (catalyst, trigger), initiating processing mechanisms in the listener's data store. M and C are fully aware how little yet is known to us about cognitive mechanisms such as storing and processing strategies in our brain, but they claim that it is the very relation between language and its perception in the human mind that linguistics should seek to describe. "Linguistics as a science is at a stage that calls for careful, detailed analysis of specific problems in language use" (p. 174). Linguistic explanation should also be teleological, that is focused on language as a purposive behaviour.

Chapter 5: "The Consequences of Variability" opens with a good observation

that the true problem with the author's approach to language, as encompassing a rather wide range of extra-linguistic notions, is "to define an investigatable domain for language" (p. 177). Yet, they refrain from suggesting any specific method of studies at this initial stage.

The remaining part of the chapter is devoted to variability and indeterminacy, which M and C consider fundamental properties of language. Closing the book, M and C express the wish that, since answers to most of the issues they raise are "shrouded in mystery" (p. 212), a tangible task for linguists is to characterize at least general principles of language processing. They do not treat their book as an exposition of a novel theory, but rather as an indication of a new direction linguistics should follow in the future.

The book reads well; the presentation of arguments is lucid and well-arranged. However, it contains a few disputable points. First of all, it cannot be forgotten that in his later writings (late 1970's) Chomsky stated more than once that grammar as a cognitive system does interact with our knowledge and beliefs: "...the actual system of grammar for a particular language cannot be determined in strict isolation from questions of fact and belief (Chomsky 1977 : 36). Yet, he insisted on the necessity of having an idealised grammar that could be supplanted with parameters referring to what M and C call "the support". Thus, the grammar, although formalized, could contain "openings" into other cognitive systems. He posited that parameters of knowledge and belief ought to be specified by a "rich theory of semantics with far-reaching explanatory principles" (1977 : 37). It seems to me that an idealisation to a restricted grammar is a sine qua non of any sensible-devised linguistic theory. Of course, we should beware of excessive formalism, but on the other hand I do not see how linguistics could work at all if it had to cover the entire field of beliefs and attitudes. If language is not delimited from other cognitive mechanisms, then it may virtually become merged with the overall functioning of human brain and linguistics may be drowned completely in psychology. I understand M and C's dislike for deduction, but I think a reasonable amount of formalism is a prerequisite for any science, and we all agree that linguistics is a science (for merits of formalism cf. Gazdar 1977: 7-10 and his apology of Chomsky's and Montague's models). M and C's views of language call to mind C. Morris's definition of pragmatics as subsuming all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena that accompany the functioning of signs (quoted in Gazdar pp. 1-2), but I seriously doubt whether language can be successfully studied within such a broad range of phenomena, considering our limited knowledge of so many aspects of cognition.

The second issue with which I disagree is M and C's exaggerated opinion that there is nothing remarkable in Chomsky's assumptions that general rule systems are similar across a number of languages and that nothing illuminating follows the way linguistic knowledge and innate learning mechanisms are organized (p. 101). To the contrary, I think that even if Chomsky's formalism may appear unpalatable or erroneous to some linguists, his indisputable, and probably the greatest, merit is raising the questions about the existence of universal grammar and stressing the role of linguistics as a "window into our mind" (cf. Lashley quoted in M and C, p. 177).

Also, treating language as a mere epiphenomenon means restricting its function to communication only. But it can be argued that language possesses other important functions in which it is far from acting as an epiphenomenon. I refer here to Vygotski's and Luria's conception of inner (egocentric) speech as a crucial factor in human self-control, in anticipation of future events and in making abstractions. Chomsky (1979 : 88) refers to the same conception while saying that the basic function of language is the expression of thought and a creative mental activity, and not just transmission of information.

Another arguable statement is that language is an imperfect, inexact, rough and ready, always changing mechanism (p. 14), whereas on reflection language seems to be a pretty well-organized structure, which apart from certain subtle considerations relating to shades of meaning becomes, at a certain stage of human ontogenesis a well-fixed and static mechanism. What is in the state of constant flux is our system of knowledge and beliefs, but not language as a structure.

Also, the idea of meaning not contained in language but mysteriously emerging from certain areas of our cognition can be questioned, for placing meaning completely outside language seems a rather strange strategy. I do not understand, either, how the lexicon could be practically constructed if it had to include a list of words and guides as to the areas of experience to which they refer (p. 133), such cues and fields of experience being in fact formally undefinable.

Despite these objections I find the book interesting and worth reading, for it tries to outline new paths for linguistics. Still, I am afraid that if linguistics becomes as broad in scope as M and C would like it to be, then no exhaustive system of grammar will ever be devised to explain language comprehensively.

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- Metafiction. The theory and practice of self-conscious fiction*. By Patricia Waugh, Pp. X+176. London and New York: Methuen, 1984. Reviewed by Janusz Semrau, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań.

Half-way through the last decade Robert Alter alarmed us to "a lamentable lack of critical appreciation for the kind of novel [...] that is acutely aware of itself as a mere structure of words" (Alter 1975 : IX). Since then his ground-breaking *Partial magic* has been joined by several book-length studies devoted to self-conscious fiction. Most recently the topic has merited the attention of the *New Accents* series which since 1977 has been dynamically responding to contemporary notions of literature. Motivated by an attempt to propose intellectual alternatives to ossified academic criticism, the series has brought out many useful primers, such as Roger Fowler's *Linguistics and the novel* (1977), Dick Hebdige's *Subculture. The meaning of style* (1979), Keir Elam's *The semiotics of theatre and drama* (1980), Christopher Norris' *Deconstruction* (1982) or Robert C. Holub's *Reception theory* (1984), with Maurice Charney's *Sexual fiction* (1981) and Walter J. Ong's *Orality and literacy* (1982) as probably its most original contributions so far.

Patricia Waugh's *Metafiction* is a significant event insofar that it is the first major treatment of contemporary self-conscious fiction in both England and America. (Actually, it develops an even larger perspective by considering in passing the writing of Jorge Luis Borges, Julio Cortázar, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Italo Calvino, Alain Robbe-Grillet and Nathalie Sarraute). Also, it professes theoretical commitment not always evident.

in the earlier studies. The range of the project is truly impressive: the author brings into her discussion over a hundred works of fiction and over twenty secondary sources from various fields. The book itself is organized into five chapters (concentrating on particular problems rather than individual texts or writers), with appended notes, index, bibliography and a list of further reading.

In line with the general orientation of the series Waugh presumes no prior knowledge of the subject on the part of the reader. This approach reveals itself clearly in the title of the introductory section: "What is metafiction and why are they saying such awful things about it?". To answer the first part of the question the author draws on an admirable selection of quotations from Laurence Sterne, B. S. Johnson, Ronald Sukenick, Donald Barthelme and John Fowles. What they collectively intimate is: "a celebration of the power of the creative imagination together with an uncertainty about the validity of its representations; an extreme self-consciousness about language, literary form and the act of writing fictions; [...] a parodic, playful, excessive or deceptively naive style of writing" (p. 2). This leads her to the following immediate definition of metafiction: "fictional writing which self-consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an artifact in order to pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality. In providing a critique of their own methods of construction, such writings not only examine the fundamental structures of narrative fiction, they also explore the possible fictionality of the world" (ibid). The answer given to the second part of the above question is by comparison somewhat scanty. Waugh mentions merely the general charges of self-indulgence, ephemerality, escapism and decadence. The issue could have been much enlivened by a congenial passage from Muriel Spark's *The comforters* (otherwise one of the most extensively analyzed novels here), which appears to explain in effect the essential thrust of self-conscious fiction — violation of the comfortable "privacy" of realistic narrative procedures, resulting directly from what an unsympathetic critic might identify as "the unhealthy thing about your mind, the way you notice absurd details, [...] it's unnatural. Because sometimes you see things that you shouldn't" (Spark 1957 : 4).

Rather fortunately, this conversational opening does not set the tone for the whole study. *Metafiction* offers a sense of argumentative intensity and of positive complexity about its thesis. It is quite widely informed by contemporary literary theory and aptly uses its vocabulary without ever lapsing into jargon. One could especially recommend here the useful and well-proportioned references to Ingarden, Jakobson and Barthes. The book seems to be governed by two ambitious if not quite new goals: 1. "to establish [...] that metafiction is a tendency or function inherent in *all* novels" (p. 5), 2. "to examine the concerns of contemporary metafiction in relation to some of the changes in the way in which reality is meditated and constructed by cultural theory and practice outside the strict domain of the 'literary'" (p. 27). The author's basic point in the second case is indisputably true: "The present increased awareness of 'meta' levels of discourse and experience is partly a consequence of an increased social and cultural self-consciousness" (p. 3). Waugh successfully incorporates into her overall discussion such socio-cultural investigations as frame analysis, play and game theories or the concept of reality/history as a construct. By suggesting and in fact projecting "alternative worlds" these related developments demonstrate how heightened awareness (an epistemological phenomenon) may acquire something of an ontological dimension. This line of reasoning dispatches an emphatic statement about the ultimate referentiality of self-conscious fiction and its enormous cultural relevance. Sections dealing with these questions, along with many intelligent linguistic observations will no doubt be appreciated as major assets of the study.

Exploring more inherently literary problems the author also brings up some germane and engaging ideas. She convincingly explains and amply illustrates for instance assimilation of formulaic narratives into contemporary "serious" writing. She has good but brief things to say about the paradox concerning the identity of fictional characters and — to give another example — in a short, self-contained essay she perceptively differentiates between the modes of literary self-consciousness characteristic of modernism and postmodernism. (Indeed, reading the book one sometimes wishes that she had been given more space to pursue her analysis further).

In general, however, this part of *Metafiction* is less satisfying and even somewhat disturbing. For one thing, Waugh occasionally displays here unnecessary defensiveness and uncertainty in articulating obvious or established verdicts, e. g., "I would argue that metafictional practice has become particularly prominent in the fiction of the last twenty years" (p. 5), "I would argue that at present the novel is coping with its most major crisis" (p. 68). On the other hand, while this can be looked upon as a commendable attempt to establish a sharp focus of its own, the study seems to be too strongly and unreservedly committed to parody as the mechanism accounting for the development and the identity of narrative art. However broad its definition and however significant and useful it is, the concept cannot offer the student of the novel a totally satisfactory sense of "release" on "textual, psychological, generic and historical levels" (p. 77). Although formally contained in one chapter ("Literary evolution: the place of parody"; it gives in itself as a matter of fact a good overview of Russian Formalism), the argument runs through the whole book and, inevitably, bears heavily upon the author's appreciation of "metafiction" and her entire approach to contemporary literature. Basically, the study introduces "metafiction" as "an elastic term which covers a wide range of fictions" (p. 18), but it does not really adhere to this formulation. The real problem is the ultimately reductive reading of artistic self-consciousness as such. Rather mechanically, in matters relating to novelistic theory and history the dialectical relationship between illusion and reality leads Waugh to an all-too-neat pattern of creation plus critique, technique and counter-technique, and balance of the familiar vs. the unfamiliar. The idea, very simply, is "to avoid a radical break with previous literary traditions" (p. 66). This appealing if precarious tension of opposition situated "*within* the form of the novel itself" (p. 11) is by all means crucial. Still, it does not inform *all*, especially aesthetic and truly innovative concerns and objectives of self-conscious writing. While one may applaud the author's effort to, generally, emphasize the line of continuity in literature and, more specifically, to naturalize the very notion of metafiction, it is finally disquieting to hear that: "The forms and language of what is offered [...] should not be so unfamiliar as to be entirely beyond the *given* modes of communication, or such fiction will be rejected as not worth the reading effort" (p. 64). The view explains the author's vehement rejection of aleatory art and her unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of any noticeable avant-garde movement in the cultural life of today at large. I would like to point out another thing here, and I am doing this only because it surfaces more than once. "The entry of the narrator into the text" is not, as Waugh suggests, "a defining feature of what has been called 'surfiction'" (p. 14); to compare it on this ground to "the self-begetting novel" is obviously inaccurate (regrettably enough there are some more minor errors of judgment in regard to recent innovative fiction).

Textual analysis presents itself as the other major problem about *Metafiction*. Apparently for reasons of space and variety it does not analyze any one work in full. In its attempt to cover a lot of ground, however, it becomes a bit confusing and, paradoxically, limited. Much of it resembles a catalogue or an annotated check-list of self-conscious fiction of the 1960's and 1970's. And when it does embark upon close reading

the author's criteria of valorization select the novels of Muriel Spark, Doris Lessing and John Fowles rather than those of B. S. Johnson or Christine Brooke-Rose as recommended, exemplary metafictional ventures of contemporary literature. From among American writers John Barth receives most attention, clearly for his strong narrative line and sheer quotability.

To end on a positive note: cautioning wisely against the danger of making simple distinctions between British and American fiction, Waugh herself comes up here with several insightful observations which, though not original, add a useful touch to the whole study, e. g., "the notion of history as either a rather badly made plot or a fiendish conspiracy is much more deeply rooted in the American than in the British novel" (p. 50), "Even a cursory examination [...] would reveal the earlier sensitivity of American fiction to the concept of reality as a construct" (p. 115). Also, despite (again) its brevity, the last section of the book ("Notes towards the definition of radical metafiction") adequately identifies, even if largely in negative terms, some of the most important techniques of postmodernism: contradiction, paradox, repetition, circularity, objets trouvés, intertextual overkill.

Still, I cannot help making one last critical remark. Given the general editor's pledge to include in each volume an informative and up-to-date exposition of significant developments in its field as a guide to further study, the absence from the present bibliography of Linda Hutcheon's *Narcissistic narrative*, Bruce Kawin's *The mind of the novel*, Larry McCaffery's *The metafictional muse* and David Lowenkron's seminal essay "The metanovel" certainly does the author and the series no credit.

In short, notwithstanding its definitive title Patricia Waugh's book — even for a nonspecialist — can merely supplement rather than replace other studies of the subject.

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